## Editorial Board

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chloé Lewis</th>
<th>James Souter</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Co-Editors-in-Chief</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Emma Tobin</th>
<th>Ursula Wagner</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Monitor Editors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Anne Peters</th>
<th>Rachel Mayer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>First Hand Editors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ellie Ott</th>
<th>Emily Bates</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Policy Monitor Editors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Chloé Lewis</th>
<th>Robyn Plasterer</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Law Monitor Editors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>James Souter</th>
<th>Hanna Baumann</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Academic Articles Editors</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### Cover Design

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Bernd Bauerochse</th>
<th>Olaf Kleist</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Cover Design</td>
<td>Layout</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

[www.the-igloo.de](http://www.the-igloo.de)

### Disclaimer

Opinions expressed by authors in OxMo do not necessarily reflect the views of the Board of Editors. As we are an independent student publication, articles published in OxMo do not represent the views of the Refugee Studies Centre or the University of Oxford. Copyright for articles published in OxMo rest with the author(s). Materials may be downloaded, reproduced and circulated in entirety provided that the title, author and source (OxMo) is acknowledged.

**For more information about OxMo visit our website** [www.oxmofm.com](http://www.oxmofm.com)
### Table of Contents

**Introduction**

Editorial  
CHLOÉ LEWIS AND JAMES SOUTER  
5

**Policy Monitor**  
7

A Step Forward to Refugee Protection? South Korea’s New Refugee Act  
CHULHYO KIM  
8

A Phantom Returns: International Responses to North Korea’s Food Shortage  
SHEENA CHOI  
12

Evolving Roles of National and International NGOs in Protracted Urban Refugee Contexts: The Case of Iraqis in the Middle East  
PATRICIA WARD  
17

**Law Monitor**  
21

A Question of Discretion: A Critical Analysis of New Legal and Evidentiary Hurdles for Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Asylum Seekers in the United Kingdom  
KATE OGG  
22

Inhuman Detention Conditions in Bangkok?  
LOUISE COLLEWET  
28

At the Crossroads of Structure and Agency: Investigating the Importance of ‘Legality’ for International Migrants  
TESS HELLGREN  
34

The Lost Children of Britain  
KATHERINE KARR  
41
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Section</th>
<th>Title</th>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Page</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Field Monitor</td>
<td>The Resettlement Journey of Somali and Sudanese Refugees from Camps in Kenya to New Zealand</td>
<td>JULIUS M. MARETE</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>The Education of Adult Refugees in Cairo: Influences and Impacts</td>
<td>VALENTINA HIEGEMANN</td>
<td>53</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>First Hand</td>
<td>Forced Migration and Global Citizenship: Reflections on My Transition From Refugee to an Immigrant and Scholar</td>
<td>AHMED KHAN</td>
<td>59</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Academic Articles</td>
<td>Caught in the Borderlands: Torture Experienced, Expressed, and Remembered by Eritrean Asylum Seekers in Israel</td>
<td>LAURIE LIJNDERS</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Where Do Forced Migrants Stand in the Migration and Development Debate?</td>
<td>SASKIA KOPPENBERG</td>
<td>77</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Perilous Territory: Non-Status People in Canada</td>
<td>ANNA SHEA</td>
<td>91</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Call for Papers</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>106</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Where Do Forced Migrants Stand in the Migration and Development Debate?

By Saskia Koppenberg

Abstract

The migration-development nexus is high on the agenda of the international community, which annually meets at the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD). Questioning the current role of forced migrants in the migration and development debate, this article shows that governmental and civil society stakeholders alike focus on labour migration while excluding forced migration from their discussions. This is the case even though -- as has been established -- forced and voluntary migration are inextricably intertwined. Furthermore, field experiences show that forced migrants do contribute to development despite their vulnerability and protection needs. In the UNHCR-led dialogue on Targeting Development Assistance, stakeholders agreed that, through targeted development assistance and the inclusion of forced migrants in development cooperation, forced migrants can be enabled to act as development agents of both their host and home countries and communities. Having outlined this, the article proposes some steps necessary to fully capitalise on forced migrants in the migration-development nexus.

Introduction

The notion of a ‘migration-development nexus’ highlights the fact that processes of migration interact closely with certain social, cultural and economic changes which are often described as constituting development.37 There is indeed a complex and multi-dimensional relationship between migration and development, with neither migration nor development being a clear-cut phenomenon. Despite not being a new concept, the migration-development nexus is still high on the agenda of the international community. Continuous migration movements and new concepts such as circular migration, remittances and the engagement of migrant diaspora perpetuate the interest of governments, academics, practitioners and civil society in the link between migration and development.

Since its creation and first constitutive meeting in Brussels in 2007, the Global Forum on Migration and Development (GFMD) has become the most important global level platform for governments, civil society and other stakeholders to discuss questions of concern such as protecting and empowering migrants for development (GFMD 2008 in Manila); integrating migration policies into development strategies (GFMD 2009 in Athens); creating partnerships for migration and human development (GFMD 2010 in Puerto Vallarta); and the question of coherence, capacity, and cooperation for migration and development (GFMD 2011 in Geneva).

With the fifth forum having taken place in Geneva in 2011, the GFMD has been established as a regular setting for governments and civil society to discuss relevant policies, exchange good practices, and engage with each other in an informal, non-binding and voluntary manner at a global level. The forum’s aim is to enhance understanding and to establish partnerships and cooperation on migration and development, fostering practical and action-oriented outcomes, as

37 For a discussion of the different concepts of development, see Koppenberg (2011: 30-35).
well as policies that maximise the development benefits of migration and minimise its negative impacts.

As a government-led process, the GFMD is open to all members and observers of the United Nations. Despite its governmental nature, the GFMD engages with different stakeholders such as international organisations, civil society organisations, the private sector, migrants associations, academics, and practitioners through the Civil Society Days; an event which pre-dates the actual Government Meeting. While recognising the crucial role that the civil society plays as an actor in the migration-development nexus, efforts have been made to integrate both events by creating a common space for debate between the civil society representatives and government delegates (Matsas 2008).

Looking at the global level dialogue on migration and development, some crucial questions arise: (1) what type of migration is addressed; (2) how are migrants expected to contribute to development; (3) who are the beneficiaries; and (4) what kind of development is aimed for? I have provided an in-depth analysis of all four questions in my book, entitled *Refugees, Migrants, and Development* (Koppenberg 2011). Situating the emergence of academic debate on the migration-displacement nexus in its broader historical context, the study brought together the GFMD debates on migration and development and the UNHCR debates of the early 2000s on Targeted Development Assistance. I critically examined the policy debates surrounding both the migration-development nexus and the forced migration-development nexus, as well as the very concept of development that has been invoked in these debates. One of the central findings of my book is that refugees and other forced migrants have been excluded from discussions at the GMFD, even though they are inextricably intertwined with other areas of migration and they possess the potential to contribute to development.

In this article, I will recapitulate the study’s findings with a special focus on the forced migration-development nexus, the exclusion of forced migrants from the GFMD agenda, and the approach that was taken in the UNHCR-led dialogue on how to enable forced migrants to contribute to development. I then further develop this analysis by including the discussions of the most recent GFMD from 2011. This analysis has been enriched by drawing on the practical experience of actors in the field which shows how forced migrants contribute to development, thus providing evidence for the existence of the forced migration-development nexus. I conclude by outlining why it is important to include forced migrants in discussions at the GFMD and what is needed to fully capitalise on forced migrants’ potential to contribute to development.

**Theoretical framework**

*The Concepts of Migration and Development*

When discussing migration and development, the term ‘migration-development nexus’ has become very popular. As described, for example, by Nyberg-Sorensen (Nyberg-Sorensen *et al.* 2002), the term denotes a complex and multi-dimensional relationship, which does not refer to one concept of migration and development, but rather to multiple concepts which have evolved over time and might even contradict each other. Let me now give two brief examples of this relationship.  

A first example concerns the impact which development might have on migration. In classical theories, an increase in development has been expected to lead to a decrease in migration. More precisely, global differences in levels of wealth and human development are seen as the main

---

38 A detailed historical account stretching as far back as the 1950s can be found in Koppenberg (2011: 35-46).
drivers of migration. In consequence, the reduction of these differences via enhanced development is expected to reduce migration. According to Bakewell, many of the migration and development initiatives have the implicit objective of reducing the flow of migration, especially to the industrialised world, thereby adhering to a ‘sedentary model’ of development which defines development as a process which enables people to stay at home (Bakewell 2007: 2). The latest studies, however, have disproved this assumption by showing that more development leads, at least until a certain level, to more migration. In his study on development drivers of international migration, De Haas shows that emigration initially rises with increased development, and only goes down once countries have reached a high level of development (De Haas 2010b).

A second example focuses on the effects that migration might have on development. Conceptualisations of the possible impacts of migration on development have varied over time. De Haas has used the notion of a ‘pendulum’ in order to describe discursive shifts in the migration and development debate (De Haas 2010a). According to his analysis, the debate ‘has swung back and forth like a pendulum, from developmentalist optimism in the 1950s and 1960s, to neo-Marxist pessimism over the 1970s and 1980s, towards more optimistic views in the 1990s and 2000s’ (De Haas 2010a: 227). The emergence of well-known terms such as ‘brain gain’, ‘brain drain’ and ‘brain circulation’ are indicative of these changes to the dominant theories of migration and development. In the 1960s, the prevailing Human Capital Theory assumed that education and training raised the productivity of workers by imparting useful knowledge and skills, thereby raising their income. In this approach, migration was seen as a means to transfer skills, education, and knowledge for human capital formation in countries of origin (‘brain gain’) and, in consequence, increase in productivity and economic growth. In contrast, the Cumulative Causation Approach that was dominant in the 1970s and 1980s highlighted the loss of highly skilled people through emigration (the so-called ‘brain drain’). On this theory, migration was perceived to be detrimental to the economic growth of workers’ countries of origin. Growth, in this view, would be asymmetrical, meaning that growth in developed countries is supported by drawing people, resources, and capital away from developing countries. The Transnational Migration Theory of the previous decades again argued that the effect of emigration of the highly skilled is not always negative but can lead to a ‘brain gain’ through ‘brain circulation’. Migrants, namely those who live across borders and go back and forth between their country of origin and country of destination, would foster the exchange and repatriation of skills and knowledge (Massey et al. 1998: 17).

**Voluntary versus Forced Migration**

At first glance, the distinction between voluntary and forced migration seems to be clear, drawing a line between (a) the voluntary decision of a person to migrate for one or, as is often the case, several motives; and (b) a person being forced to migrate in the interest of personal safety, motivated by differing types of force (Düvell 2006: 14-16). This is especially the case when distinguishing between those who are seeking employment or educational opportunities and others who are fleeing persecution and violence. The latter group is clearly defined by international law that entitles those who have a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion to a set of rights and to international protection.
Figure 1: Main phases of the academic debate on migration and development (Koppenberg 2011: 37)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Phase</th>
<th>Migration and development</th>
<th>Migration and development theories</th>
<th>Key concepts</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Phase 1:</td>
<td>Positive relation</td>
<td>Neoclassical Theory</td>
<td>Economic disparities, wage levels, labour supply/demand, labour migration, utility-maximising individuals, factor price equalisation, economic growth</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1950s and 1960s</td>
<td>Modernisation Theory</td>
<td>Transformation from traditional agriculture to modern industry, universal pathway to industrialisation, large scale transfers of money, technology and expertise, economic growth, migrants financial and social remittances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Human Capital Theory</td>
<td>Human capital accumulation and transfers</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 2:</td>
<td>Negative relation</td>
<td>Dependency Theory</td>
<td>Exogenous causes of underdevelopment, development of underdevelopment, emancipation from the capitalist world economy, endogenous economic development</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1970s and 1980s</td>
<td>Cumulative Causation Approach</td>
<td>Asymmetrical growth, migration creates backwash effects (loss of human capital, remittance dependency, negative effects of social remittances), migration leads to economic spatial and interpersonal disparities</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>World Systems Approach</td>
<td>Core, semi-periphery and periphery, expansion of the capitalist world economy and the marginalised integration into the capitalist world system leads to migration, migration as a world-level labour supply system, perpetuation of underdevelopment and peripheral status</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Phase 3:</td>
<td>Positive relation but more differentiated views</td>
<td>New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM)</td>
<td>Societal context of migration, lack of access to capital or insurance institutions, migration as income diversification and risk sharing, remittances, investment in profitable production</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Since the end of 1980s</td>
<td>Migration Networks Theory</td>
<td>Relationship between migrants, former migrants and non-migrants, chain migration, remittances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Transnational Migration Theory</td>
<td>Globalisation, ties across borders, transnational identity, transnational communities, diaspora, circular migration, collective remittances</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
Social Capital Theory | Resources gained through networks, translation into human or financial capital
---|---
Alternative Development | Society and migrants as agency of development, people-centred, participatory, bottom-up, series of alternative development concepts
Neoliberalism | Non-state approach, homo economicus, market-led economic growth, Washington Consensus, structural adjustment, liberalisation, decentralisation, and privatisation, financial remittances.

On closer scrutiny, however, the line between forms of forced and voluntary migration becomes blurred. The truth is that forced migrants not only include refugees, but also asylum seekers and internally displaced persons (IDPs), whose status is not as well defined as those of refugees. Furthermore, migration is most often motivated by complex, mixed and shifting motives. Such motives render a clear distinction between, for example, the voluntary decision to migrate for educational reasons or forced migration due to persecution difficult to maintain. Even UNHCR, which sets forced migrants apart from other migrants, and especially refugees as protected by the 1951 Refugee Convention, has turned to the notion that ‘human mobility is growing in scale, scope and complexity’ (Crisp 2008: 3), while stressing that ‘people are prompted [to] leave their own country by a combination of fears, uncertainties, hopes and aspirations which can be very difficult to unravel’ (Crisp 2008: 5).

As is increasingly recognised, the mixed nature of migratory movements shows that voluntary and forced migration are often part of the same phenomenon. Migratory movements may include people who are seeking employment or educational opportunities, who want to reunite with family members or people who are fleeing persecution, conflict or violence in their countries of origin (UNHCR 2012a). Thus, UNHCR indeed maintains its position that it is possible and necessary to identify refugees as a special category of people protected under international law but has, at the same time, become engaged in the broader migration discourse, arguing that often there is no clear distinction between forms of forced and voluntary migration when refugees and other migrants move alongside each other (Crisp 2008: 2, 4, 5).

Furthermore, in cases in which a migrant moves due to economic motives, in what is generally considered as voluntary migration, the question arises as to whether the person’s economic circumstances might have forced him or her to migrate. As Turton has correctly observed, ‘[i]t turns out, on closer inspection, that most migrants make their decision to migrate in response to a complex set of external constraints’ (Turton 2003: 5). He therefore prefers to speak of a continuum as introduced by Anthony Richmond (1994: 59) and Nicholas Van Hear (1998: 44). While Richmond defines a continuum running from proactive to reactive migration, Van Hear looks at the range between voluntary and involuntary migration, and migrants’ varying degrees of choice and options (Turton 2003: 6).

By its very nature, forced migration entails a certain vulnerability of the migrant. When fleeing due to a fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group, or political opinion, the migrant may have lost his or her property, job or social network. This, in combination with a lack of protection or an insecure status that limits the access to services such as education or health care, may lead to food insecurity, weak health conditions and social marginalisation. In their vulnerability, forced migrants become beneficiaries
of humanitarian aid or social benefits providing short term relief. But does their vulnerable status and need for protection make them less valuable as agents for development?

Where Do Forced Migrants Stand in the Migration and Development Debate?

The GFMD: Some Research Findings

In order to elaborate on the question of where forced migrants stand in the migration and development debate, I will begin by recapitulating the findings of my in-depth analysis of the GFMD. When analysing numerous reports of the GFMD from 2007 to 2010, I revealed the subjects, concepts, and theories that dominate the discussions. I found that the GFMD is primarily concerned with labour migrants from developing countries who cross international borders in order to work, and who later return in a flexible manner, temporarily or circularly, to their home country. Besides meeting labour market demands in countries of destination, labour migrants are expected by the GFMD participants to contribute to the development of their countries of origin, their families and communities at home through the remittance of financial, human, and social capital, as well as business activities, productive investments and participation in, conducting of and/or financial support for national development activities.

At the core of the GFMD debate on migration and development lies the identification of migrants as agents for development. According to the GFMD participants, their contribution to development can be strengthened and fostered through: (a) the migrants’ integration into the host country; (b) the protection of their rights; and (c) their human development.

Within the GFMD debates, development is defined in economic terms such as employment, income maximisation, productivity, investment, and economic growth, thereby moving within a spectrum of economic development theories such as neoclassical theory, modernisation theory, New Economics of Labour Migration (NELM), and neo-liberal theory. The findings show that the GFMD remains within a narrowly-defined economic paradigm. Alternative concepts of development have not yet been considered. Human development, for example, has mainly been perceived as enabling migrants to exercise their agency, to facilitate their productive activities, and to contribute better to economic development, but has not been recognised as a development objective in itself (Koppenberg 2011: 102-104).39

Another crucial finding, which provides the basis for the following discussion, is that forced migrants have been largely excluded from the GFMD discussions. While civil society representatives claimed during the Civil Society Days at the GFMD in 2009 that all forms of migration should be considered (GFMD 2009: 6), my study shows that the discussions at the Government Days, which represent the essential part of the government-led GFMD, are focused on labour migrants and international labour migration, while forced migrants such as refugees, IDPs, and asylum seekers are largely left out (Koppenberg 2011: 49-51).

My research shows that refugees and other forced migrants have been systematically excluded as a topic of the GFMD, even though ‘they are an important aspect of migration and inextricably intertwined with other areas of migration’ (Betts in Koppenberg 2011: xi). In fact, as I discussed above, migration is motivated by complex, mixed, and shifting motives and refugees and other migrants increasingly move alongside each other.

If the movement of refugees, asylum seekers and other voluntary and involuntary forms of migration can be regarded as one single phenomenon, why are forced migrants not included in the global level dialogue on migration and development? As I now argue, there are a number of

---

39 For a discussion of the dominant development concepts, see Koppenberg (2011: 95-98).
probable reasons for the exclusion of forced migrants from the migration and development debate.

Firstly, forced migration is generally regarded as a humanitarian rather than as a development issue, dealt with by UNHCR and humanitarian actors (Crisp 2001). According to Betts, ‘[t]his view is based on the assumption that refugee movements in the developing world generally stem from short-term humanitarian emergencies’ (Betts 2009: 4). Secondly, because host governments are concerned that once foreign humanitarian assistance has stopped, there will be no development funds available to support populations in need, they are reluctant to change strategy (UNHCR 2004: 5). And, thirdly, ‘since refugees are not part of the government’s political constituency, there is a lack of political will to incorporate refugees in development strategies’ (UNHCR 2004: 5). Hence, the exclusion of forced migrants from the migration and development debate is mainly due to the gap between the concepts of humanitarian action and development, characterised by the idea that, ‘[w]hereas humanitarian aid provides short-term relief which involves immediate, survival assistance to the victims of crises and conflict, development aid is characterized by long-term support to improve the general economic, political and social climate of countries’ (UNHCR 2004: 5).

The GFMD 2011: Perpetuating the Agenda

During the most recent forum held in Geneva from 29 November until 2 December 2011, the GFMD stuck to its traditional agenda that focuses on labour migration and financial remittances and excludes forced migration. With discussions on ‘Labour Mobility and Development’, ‘Addressing Irregular Migration through Coherent Migration’ and ‘Development Strategies and Tools for Evidence-based Migration and Development Policies’, no space was provided to discuss the link between forced migration and development in the Government Days of the 2011 GFMD (GFMD 2011b: 4). Consequently, when looking more closely at the Report of the Proceedings that summarises the debates which were held, at no point were the potential linkages between forced migration and development discussed. When participants included forced migration in the discussion at all, it was only to acknowledge the mixed character of many irregular movements (GFMD 2011b: 29), highlighting the need for protection: ‘[i]mproved mechanisms are needed to ensure that migrants are rescued at sea...and differentiated upon arrival for the specific protection to which they are entitled under international, regional and national law’ (GFMD 2011c: 4-5).

The Civil Society Days of the 2011 GFMD had a similar focus as the Government Days, namely ‘Labour Migration’, ‘Development Alternatives to Migration’, and the ‘Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families’. The only time when forced migration was discussed, also here the need for protection was exclusively emphasised, casting forced migrants solely as victims: ‘[i]mproved mechanisms are needed to ensure that migrants are rescued at sea...and differentiated upon arrival for the specific protection to which they are entitled under international, regional and national law‘ (GFMD 2011c: 4-5).

The Forced Migration-Development Nexus

Despite the selective focus of the GFMD agenda, civil society actors, academics and practitioners stress time and again that forced migrants do have the potential to contribute to development, once they enjoy protection and their needs have been met. Betts, for example, has argued that ‘[t]he GFMD should recognise that refugees are an important component of the wider “migration and development” agenda’ (Betts 2009: 3). In fact, as the main ambassador for forced migrants, UNHCR has become increasingly engaged in regional and global policy discussions on the interface between refugee protection and international migration with the aim of protecting refugees within broader migratory movements. In 2006, UNCHR issued a 10-Point Plan of Action as a tool to assist states with the incorporation of refugee protection into
migration strategies, thereby taking into account the needs of refugees and other forced migrants travelling as part of larger mixed movements (UNHCR 2012b). In this context, UNHCR pointed out at the first GFMD in 2007 that:

…there is a need for the international community to recognize the important linkages that exist between forced migration and the development process, and to ensure that such linkages are fully addressed in the effort to establish coherent and constructive approaches to the issue of migration and development (UNHCR 2007: 1).

Actually, despite the focus of the GFMD on labour migration, participants of the Civil Society Days acknowledged, albeit briefly, forced migrants’ potential to become agents of development once they have been provided with opportunities to make use of their skills and productive capabilities (GFMD 2008: 7). The major challenge, the civil society participants said, is to ‘identify whether – and how – migration by necessity can be turned into an opportunity for development’ (GFMD 2007: 25).

An answer to this question gives the UNHCR-led dialogue on Targeting Development Assistance (TDA). The dialogue was launched in the framework of the so-called Convention Plus initiative. During the fifty-third session of UNHCR’s Executive Committee in October 2002, High Commissioner Ruud Lubbers called for the development of new arrangements and tools for improving refugee protection worldwide, and facilitating durable solutions for refugees and other people of concern. He proposed that this could be achieved through international cooperation and the linking of refugee protection to migration, security, and development. The outcome was expected to take the form of multilateral special agreements complementing the 1951 Geneva Convention. For this reason, UNHCR launched Convention Plus, a process of discussion and negotiation with member states and other partners of UNHCR, to mobilise support and to bring about firmer commitments. The initiative ran from 2003 until 2005. The TDA strand was one of the three generic strands of the process; the other two being ‘strategic resettlement’ and ‘irregular secondary movements’. TDA aims to facilitate local integration and repatriation by incorporating refugees and other forced migrants into national development plans and allocating additional development assistance, thereby enabling them to contribute to development in their host country or their country of origin upon their return. A forum composed of UNHCR’s stakeholders, including executive committee members, standing committee observers, and non-governmental organisations (NGOs), was established in 2003 and convened biannually by the High Commissioner in order to consider the progress made in the different Convention Plus strands (UNHCR 2005).

An analysis of the reports and documents which record the UNHCR-led dialogue on TDA shows how the participants of the UNHCR-led discussion on TDA link forced migration and development (Koppenberg 2011). The findings outline that, within the TDA dialogue, there is agreement that forced migrants indeed possess the potential to contribute to development, but that this capacity is stifled due to the fact that forced migrants are often passive recipients of humanitarian aid. Therefore, participants in the TDA discussions stress that forced migrants must first be enabled to use their potential in order to contribute to development. Their idea is that, through targeted development assistance and the inclusion of forced migrants in development cooperation and related instruments – such as development policies, programmes and practices, poverty reduction strategies and post-conflict transition plans – the needs of forced migrants will be met, their poverty mitigated, their human development and self-reliance enhanced, and their rights ensured. This will in turn enhance their productive capacities and enable them to make a positive contribution to the development of their host and home

__________

40 For more information about Convention Plus, see www.unhcr.org/convention-plus.
countries and communities through their skills, knowledge, business activities, employment, and engagement in development activities (Koppenberg 2011: 77-88).

**Forced Migration and Development: Evidence from the Field**

There are several experiences from the field which show how the forced migration-development nexus works in practice and what can be done to facilitate the link between the two. In what follows, I present some examples of this.

The Jesuit Refugee Service (JRS), an international organisation that serves and advocates on behalf of refugees and other forced migrants, provides evidence for the forced migration-development nexus from its field work. Its experiences in Liberia from 2003 to 2008 offer a concrete example of how forced migrants use their skills and capacities to contribute to development and post-conflict reconstruction in their country of origin.

When the civil war in Liberia came to an end in 2003 and hundreds of thousands of IDPs and refugees had been repatriated, the JRS provided them with basic necessities such as food, shelter and healthcare. Moreover, the JRS targeted activities to harness the skills and capacities of returning refugees. Schools were renovated, school programmes developed, and a health awareness programme established by the labour, skills, capacities, expertise, and leadership of returning refugees, IDPs and the local population. The forced migrants made use of the skills and knowledge they acquired while hosted in neighbouring countries for the benefit of their home communities (JRS 2008b).

Another experience of JRS demonstrates that forced migrants also use their skills and capacities to benefit the communities that host them. Between 2005 and 2008 approximately 1,300 refugees from Coté d'Ivoire and Sierra Leone were encamped in eastern Liberia. Vocational training has been provided for refugees and local Liberians in different professions such as tailoring, hairdressing, radio and television repair, baking and soap making, thereby facilitating the start of income-generating activities (JRS 2008b).

JRS does not deny the need for specific legal and policy mechanisms to ensure forced migrants’ protection. On the basis of their Liberian experience, however, they argue that migration and development policies must make use of the skills and capacities of all migrants – whether voluntary or forced (JRS 2008b: 4). ‘The exclusion of forced migrants from the migration and development agenda’, they say, ‘withholds a potentially important resource for development from both countries of origin and reception’ (JRS 2008a: 1).

A second example which provides evidence for the forced migration-development nexus is given by research commissioned by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) on the Somali diaspora. The study is based on qualitative and quantitative research that has been conducted in Somaliland, Puntland and South/Central Somalia, as well as in multiple destination cities with a high concentration of Somali diaspora members such as Dubai, London, Minneapolis, Nairobi, Oslo and Toronto. The research provides evidence that refugees make a significant contribution to relief, development and political processes in their country of origin. The study examined diasporas’ motivations for supporting development in their countries of origin, the factors that influence the means and mechanisms by which the support is mobilised and transferred to Somalia, and the ways in which local Somali actors use the support that they receive (UNDP 2011: 1).
Since the collapse of the central state in 1991 that was followed by insecurity, political instability, conflict, extreme violence and food insecurity, many Somalis left their country. Living conditions have been particularly poor since the end of 2006, when Ethiopia occupied Somali territory. These and the continuous fight of the Transitional Federal Government against the al-Shabaab movement led to massive population displacement. It is estimated that more than 1.5 million Somalis are internally displaced, while between 1 and 1.5 million live outside the country. Support from the latter helped those remaining in the country to survive in a hostile environment (UNDP 2011: 1, 11).

The UNDP study shows that Somalis living abroad are an essential provider of humanitarian and development assistance. It is estimated that between US$130 and 200 million is provided annually by the diaspora, either mobilised at individual level or collectively through households and associations of various types (UNDP 2011: 3, 32).

Three main types of support from the diaspora have been identified: (1) financial remittances; (2) in-kind support; and (3) technical assistance. Financial transfers usually take place through the hawala money transfer system; a system of transferring money thoroughly created and operated by Somalis. In-kind support means the delivery of goods and materials (books, medical supplies, machinery, etc) to Somalia or the procurement of these goods in a nearby market hub. Technical assistance is provided in-person and entails the return of the person to Somalia for a period of time where he or she provides advice, leadership, training, and so on (UNDP 2011: 5-6, 40, 45). The largest proportion of support goes to relatives to help them to meet basic household
expenses (food, education, health care, housing costs, etc). Other main recipients are local NGOs, social service providers (health care facilities, educational institutions, etc), and private investors and businesspeople (groups or individuals) (UNDP 2011: 15).

The findings suggest that, ‘the more economically and politically integrated people are, the more likely they are to also contribute to the country of origin, since they have achieved a reasonable level of stability in their lives’ (UNDP 2011: 15). The study showed that the activities of the diaspora are influenced by a variety of factors, particularly: (a) a legal status such as permanent residence or citizenship that allows to travel back to the country of origin; (b) economic stability defined through both levels of and payment for employment; and (c) integration into the country of destination while profiting from education and family welfare. These will increase the capacity of the diaspora to support their families and communities in their country of origin (UNDP 2011: 14).

Conclusion

Refugees and other forced migrants have not yet been considered as agents of development by the GFMD. However, as this article highlights by showcasing the practical experience of actors in the field, forced migrants have the potential to, and actually do, contribute to development in receiving and destination countries. This and the mixed nature of migration, where forced migration represents an integral part of broader migration movements, can be used as the basis of strong arguments for the inclusion of the forced migration-development nexus in the GFMD discussions. Neglecting to discuss the link between forced migration and development at the GFMD leads to a failure to develop tailored policies and practices that support forced migrants in contributing to development. This in turn implies the loss of development resources.

In fact, the inclusion of forced migration in the GFMD agenda matters, both for the migrants themselves and their host and home countries. This is because the topics discussed at the GFMD attract the attention of policy-makers and project-implementers from around the world. Throughout the five years of the GFMD’s existence, an average of 149 countries and 34 international organisations have been present at each annual GFMD meeting. They are the actors who develop recommendations for policy and practice on how to foster the link between migration and development. Putting forced migration on the GFMD agenda would therefore not only raise awareness about its link with development but also has the potential to direct states, international organisations and other actors towards defining targeted policies and practices that can support forced migrants in contributing to development, thereby capitalizing on a so far neglected, yet important, developmental resource.

In order to fully capitalise on forced migrants’ potential to contribute to development, it will be necessary to:

- Raise awareness of who the migrants addressed in migration-development debates are;
- Conduct further research on forced migrants’ potential to be agents of development and on what is needed to enable them to contribute to development;
- Find further examples from the field on forced migrants in migration and development;
- Identify best practices on how to facilitate forced migrants’ engagement in migration and development; and
- Implement targeted policies, programmes, and projects.

As can be drawn from the approach elaborated by the UNHCR-led discussion on TDA and from the practical experiences presented above, the latter will need to focus on several
objectives. Firstly, such policies, programmes and projects must be targeted at meeting forced migrants’ basic needs; developing their skills and capacities; ensuring their legal status; facilitating their integration in hosting communities; and enhancing their economic stability through policy-making and legislative processes as well as targeted assistance and inclusion in development programmes. Secondly, such initiatives must focus on including forced migrants in the development and implementation of development initiatives. Only once such policies, programmes and projects are put in place will the relationship between forced migration and development have been truly recognised and acted upon by the international community.

Saskia Koppenberg is a German national who graduated in International Development Studies from the University of Vienna. Her research focus is on the migration-development nexus with special interest in forced migration issues. She published several articles, papers and an academic book. Koppenberg currently lives in Cairo where she works with the International Organization for Migration (IOM).

References Cited


Oxford Monitor of Forced Migration, Volume 2, Number 1


