

# Leveraging Human Mobility to Rescue the 2030 Agenda

IOM Flagship Report  
for the SDG Summit

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After participating in a three-day photography training workshop in Abidjan, Côte d'Ivoire, six young photographers put their new skills into practice by attending reintegration and recreation activities organized by IOM for returnees and community members.  
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# EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

At the midway point of the 2030 Agenda for Sustainable Development (2030 Agenda), the world faces a crossroads. The promise to **Leave No One Behind** and achieve the SDGs is in stark peril, as development progress is reversing under the combined impacts of the climate emergency, conflicts, economic downturns and uneven pandemic recovery. Progress on only 12 per cent of Sustainable Development Goals (SDG) targets is on track, progress on 50 per cent is weak and insufficient, and progress has stalled or reversed on more than 30 per cent, with developing countries and the world's most vulnerable bearing the brunt of this.<sup>i</sup> Moreover, our ways of working to meet the SDGs are inadequate. The SDG funding gap in developing countries is estimated at USD 3.9 trillion<sup>ii</sup> and despite major steps taken to support SDG implementation, including the Decade of Action and United Nations development system (UNDS) reform, there is an urgent need to do more and take radical action.

Today's sobering picture of reversing SDG progress is a clarion call to redouble efforts to leave no one behind and overcome the triple planetary crisis – and to utilize every available solution to achieve this. This generation has the mandate to address unprecedented global challenges with all possible levers. Human mobility is one such lever and in fact, none of today's challenges, from climate change to conflict, can be tackled effectively without considering human mobility. While migrants are often among the furthest left behind, they simultaneously push forward development, well-being and growth for people and planet. Human mobility is already a force for progress that the international community must leverage to help reach the SDGs. Well-managed human mobility is key to achieving the 2030 Agenda. Mobility must be integrated across development, humanitarian and many other efforts, which bring alive various mobility-development links. Whichever way it is looked at, human mobility is part of the solution to rescue the SDGs.

Human mobility trends are increasingly complex, driven and impacted by major global transformations. Time and again, around the world people on the move have revitalised and brought development gains to sectors and areas that policy sometimes struggles to reach. Managed well, mobility can be a cornerstone of sustainable development, prosperity, and progress; it can benefit communities of origin and destination, as migration is linked to poverty reduction, innovation and entrepreneurship, investment and other mechanisms for progress. Human mobility is an integral part of the 2030 Agenda, which recognises several of its links to sustainable development and recognizes it is not possible to leave no one behind without considering migrants. The Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration also builds on the 2030 Agenda and acknowledges through a comprehensive agenda how, if managed effectively, mobility can help spur progress.

This report showcases how, with the right action, human mobility can help achieve the SDGs, and support development beyond 2030. It presents related evidence under **six Acceleration Actions**, presenting potential benefits of policy action through analysis from the IOM Regional Office for Central, North America and the Caribbean, the Centre on Migration, Policy and Society (COMPAS, University of Oxford), and World Data Lab WDL GmbH. It also provides examples of successful initiatives, and recommendations on how to move forward. The driving force behind these Actions is connection. They are relevant to policy areas which often operate separately, bringing new connections for the consideration of policymakers. This is reflected in the mix of SDGs each Action supports; many are not often seen in the same sentence. The Actions also aim to connect countries and communities. They are universally relevant, giving a role to play to countries in all regions, in receiving and sending countries of migration, across income levels. They are in line with the six transitions identified by the UNSDG – climate, biodiversity and pollution, energy, food systems, education, jobs and social protection, and digital connectivity. Finally, they knit together several cross-cutting elements of mobility and development policy, which must be connected to all interventions.

## Acceleration Actions for Development

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### 1. Extend social protection and universal health coverage to all migrants, to reduce inequalities and vulnerabilities and enable their active participation in and contribution to societies.

Social protection and universal health coverage (UHC) are fundamental to resilient and inclusive societies, and key to meeting the SDGs. However, migrants tend to enjoy less social protection and health coverage than natives. Expanding access would reduce inequalities and maximize migrants' contributions to societies.

In Colombia, migrants are 39 percentage points less likely to be affiliated with a health programme than Colombians, and more likely to face several job-related vulnerabilities. Migrants affiliated with a health programme are less likely to face these issues, suggesting that extending access helps boost migrant well-being and participation in society.

### 2. Reduce remittance costs and leverage different types of diaspora contributions to boost sustainable development finance, trade systems and global value chains.

Through remittances, knowledge transfer and many other mechanisms, human mobility stimulates development financing, trade and Global Value Chains (GVCs). The world needs ambitious plans to finance sustainable development, and new strategies to support trade systems and transnational supply chains; managed effectively, mobility can be a building block for these plans.

A decrease of remittance transaction costs by 5 percentage points could lead to an extra USD 6.88 billion being sent to Low- and Middle-Income Countries (LMICs) per year, and USD 560 million to small island developing States (SIDS). By 2030, this could mean an extra USD 41.25 billion sent to LMICs, and USD 3.36 billion to SIDS.

Migration can support trade by boosting international

exports. Across Central America, North America and the Caribbean, a 1 per cent rise in migrant stock in a country is associated with a 0.23 per cent increase in exports on average. This is equivalent to an estimated increase of USD 7,751 in exports per additional migrant.

### 3. Weave human mobility into development and urban planning, to increase social cohesion and boost development for all.

Today 41 per cent of citizens around the world feel that their sense of social cohesion is weak. While taking a whole-of-society approach to policy and including everyone's voices in policy is critical, migrants' inclusion to date is patchy. Integrating migrants and human mobility across development planning has the potential to strengthen policies and boost cohesion, creating more effective plans.

This is especially relevant in cities – 5 billion people will live in urban areas by 2050, displacement is increasingly urban, and city infrastructure will need to adapt accordingly; and as 65 per cent of SDG targets are linked to local government activity. Acting on mobility-development links requires close collaboration between national and local levels. Empowering local leaders and working directly with communities, cities and rural governments creates development solutions that work on the ground in real time.

In the Republic of Moldova, a project connecting communities with diaspora via hometown associations, extended basic services and job creation for all in local communities. In Iraq, when crafting local peace agreements between returning IDPs and their home communities, IDP representation enabled negotiations that would otherwise have been impossible.

### 4. Develop safe and regular migration pathways, invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of qualifications, to meet the needs of changing labour markets and divergent demographic trends.

While migrants bring in-demand skills to destination communities, many still work in jobs unsuited to their

qualifications. Improving recognition of migrants' skills would benefit migrants and societies alike. Meanwhile, economic and demographic trends evolve fast; better labour mobility and skills development policies can equip countries to face these changes effectively to boost growth.

By 2030 the 15-64-year-old population in OECD economies will decrease by -0.6 per cent; without migrants, this rate would be -4 per cent. Increasing current annual migration flows to compensate for this deficit would add USD 90 billion to GDP. By 2030, migrants will contribute an estimated USD 500 billion to OECD economies; around the same as the GDP of Austria.

**5. Reduce the digital access gap for people on the move, to improve integration and unlock innovative and green entrepreneurship.**

Many mobile populations face poor digital access, limiting their inclusion in many aspects. Digital inequalities also hold migrants' entrepreneurship back; migration is linked to innovation and self-employment. Closing the digital divide would not only decrease inequalities but allow more migrant-led innovation to flourish.

In Kenya, there is a digital and financial divide: migrants

are 19 percentage points less likely to have a bank account than Kenyan-born. Migrants who use the internet daily are 38 percentage points more likely to have a bank account, suggesting that improving migrants' digital access and financial inclusion could help unlock their contributions. In the United Kingdom, migrants are 8 percentage points more likely than the UK-born to want to open a business. Increasing digital inclusion could help further boost their entrepreneurship; migrants with higher internet use are more likely to be self-employed.

**6. Integrate human mobility into national adaptation and climate change response plans, and invest in preparedness and loss and damages provisions, to forge impactful climate and peace action.**

The links between climate change, conflict and human mobility, while complex, are key to sustainable action. However, mobility is not integrated consistently across relevant policy frameworks and processes. Integrating mobility considerations is integral to peace and climate change policy, and can save lives and aid development.

Out of selected pairs of countries that were affected by the same climate change-related disasters, those who had included human mobility in their Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) tended to have lower related disaster costs.

Acceleration Actions linked with SDGs



## Looking Ahead

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This generation is equipped with unprecedented knowledge, technologies and resources, and “breaking through to a better future” demands use of this major advantage. Today there is growing evidence about how if managed effectively, mobility benefit individuals, families, communities and societies around the world. As the world redoubles its efforts to leave no one behind and overcome the triple planetary crisis, every available solution must be leveraged. Mainstreaming human mobility considerations into development plans must gather speed to respond to these and take advantage of the opportunities migrants bring. This document offers a glimpse of the possible along six Acceleration Actions. What else can be done so that mobility supports our shared aims for people and planet?

› **Double down on all global commitments and consider how human mobility can support them.**

We have the blueprints for transformation: the 2030 Agenda, Addis Ababa Action Agenda, Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction, the Paris Agreement and others. It is fundamental to achieve progress on these, integrating human mobility considerations throughout, and developing links between them.

› **Commit to and implement mobility-centred frameworks.**

The Secretary General’s Action Agenda on Internal Displacement can transform the way displacement crises are approached. The Global Compact for Migration offers a 360-degree comprehensive framework of good migration governance that must be implemented; this will also propel forward the 2030 Agenda.

› **Weave human mobility into the new Rescue Plan for People and Planet.**

Human mobility must be part of action under each pillar of the plan. In particular, it can play a key role in innovative development financing moving forward and address the SDG funding gap; mobility-driven financing mechanisms can complement the United Nations SDG Stimulus Plan.

› **End misinformation and political manipulation of human mobility.** Migration has been simplified, stigmatized and politicized around the world. This must change, to stop unjust scapegoating and clear the road ahead for transformative change, which cannot be effective without a fundamental shift in migration-related narratives.

Leveraging human mobility for progress has key implications for how development is done. Mobility has links across humanitarian, development, peace and many other dimensions; insights from across these must be called on. Change requires collaboration across sectors and areas of expertise and greater collaboration across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus (HDPN). Strong international cooperation is also key. The political economy of migration governance is complex and, still too often, zero sum. Mobility links different geographies; its policy responses do too. **The needs of countries are more likely to be met if considered together – collective gains reward collaboration on migration governance.**

Not only does the 2030 Agenda remain possible and essential, but we must think ahead to do more. The SDG Summit Declaration can reignite global SDG commitment and advance the role of human mobility as part of an urgent strategy to achieve shared aims. But beyond this, how can mobility support Our Common Agenda and the 2024 Summit of the Future? Now is the time to collectively ask and answer these questions.

Put very simply, the world we want will not be achieved without considering safe, orderly and regular human mobility. We can acknowledge this and channel mobility to help achieve shared objectives; **transformative change is within reach.**



Shelter construction underway at  
Bakassi IDP Camp in Nigeria.  
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# INTRODUCTION: HUMAN MOBILITY AND THE 2030 AGENDA

There are over 281 million international migrants today, and human mobility trends are increasingly complex, driven and impacted by major global transformations. For example, COVID-19 radically altered movements around the world, climate-related displacement continues to rise, and the mobility effects of wide-reaching digitalization

are only just starting to unfold.<sup>iii</sup>

Further, commonly used categories of

migrants have shifted and overlapped as, for example, the distinction between voluntary and forced migration does not always capture the intricacies of actual mobility.<sup>iv</sup> While trends have evolved fast, the overall proportion of international migrants to the total global population – around 3.6%<sup>v</sup> – has not changed much over time. It is clear that human mobility is a constant, and part of the world's economic, social and cultural architecture.

Managed well, **human mobility can be a cornerstone of sustainable development, prosperity** and progress. The 2030 Agenda itself is built on this understanding. Migrant workers, remittances, human trafficking, the global health workforce, international students, migration governance – these and other topics are included in the 2030 Agenda.<sup>vi</sup> Further, it is not possible to leave no one behind without considering all migrants. Mobility is an integral component of the Sustainable Development Goals, woven across Goals and targets. This acknowledges the migration–development nexus, which can be defined as “the totality of mechanisms through which migration and development dynamics affect each other”.<sup>vii</sup> While the nexus is complex, today we know more about it than before. Mobility can benefit communities of origin, where it is linked to poverty reduction, increased innovation and entrepreneurship, and investment in businesses and human capital. These impacts are realized through different mechanisms, for example as migrants transfer knowledge, skills, or money – in 2022, estimated remittances sent to low

and middle-income countries were USD 647 billion.<sup>viii</sup> Mobility can also benefit communities of destination, as migrants buoy specific labour markets, lead to greater productivity and contribute to countries' fiscal budgets. For example, every additional 1 per cent of immigration could boost GDP growth in destination countries by 2 per cent,<sup>ix</sup> and eliminating mobility restrictions could increase world GDP by 11.5–12.5 per cent.<sup>x</sup>

Finally, migrants themselves

stand to benefit socially, economically and otherwise

from moving. Mobility offers individuals potentially

significant increases in well-being and income, with

gains often much larger than

those from development interventions.<sup>xi</sup> For example,

after moving to a developed country, migrants from the poorest countries experienced a 15-fold increase in income, doubling of school enrolment rates, and

16-fold reduction in child mortality.<sup>xii</sup> In some cases, a “triple-win” dynamic is at play: a virtuous cycle where migrants, communities of origin and destination

simultaneously benefit from migration.

However, the benefits of human mobility are not guaranteed. Mobility can also pose challenges, with

negative effects on specific sectors of the economy, labour force, or society that bring fresh policy

problems.<sup>xiii</sup> These challenges can pertain to communities of origin, for example where excess

emigration from a specific locality or of those with a specific skillset may cause issues. Likewise, there

may be challenges for communities of destination; for example, if substantial additional resources are

needed to support the education and integration of some migrants. Migrants could face negative effects

themselves, as migration often entails high personal costs and significant risk. Since 2014, more than 57,000

deaths of migrants on migratory routes have been recorded.<sup>xiv</sup> Migrant workers around the world often

**There are over 281 million international migrants today**

**Every additional 1 per cent of immigration could boost GDP growth in destination countries by 2 per cent**

undertake dangerous work, and overall migration remains far from safe. These negative outcomes from human mobility are avoidable; they occur most often when policy choices and stakeholder preferences are misaligned,<sup>xv</sup> and when existing development solutions are not applied.

**None of the major challenges facing people and planet today can be tackled effectively without considering human mobility.**

The climate emergency is accelerating, adding to existing multiple crises in various countries around the world, while violent conflict and poverty continue. Many societies are highly unequal and divided, and the lingering effects of the pandemic have weakened social cohesion. Public budgets are limited and face imminent further constraints. Meanwhile, demographic trends, the world of work and global digital capacities are changing fast. Human mobility is linked to all of these complexities – and needs to be hardwired in their solutions. For example, disasters, climate change and environmental degradation will continue to contribute to large-scale population movements. Meanwhile, human mobility impacts the environment, ecosystems, and the availability of natural resources, meaning that if managed well, it could also be a form of adaptation to environmental stressors. While populations in many countries are contracting, those in many least-developed countries (LDCs) are booming. Young people entering the workforce may

not have the skills needed in the global labour market, leading to increased competition for workers. This challenge could be partially addressed with sustained investment in well-managed skills development and mobility programmes; in this way, rapid demographic change is making migration increasingly necessary for countries.<sup>xvi</sup>

As knowledge on certain dimensions of mobility has ripened – including why people migrate, what effects this may have, and what can shape these outcomes – policy is catching up with what we know. Aside from the 2030 Agenda, some global-level frameworks have acknowledged the links between mobility and development, notably the Global Compact for Safe, Orderly and Regular Migration (see Box 1). Multiple international legal frameworks underline universal rights and the need to include migrants – crucial to leaving no one behind. At today’s critical juncture when global stakeholders are urgently seeking solutions to meet the 2030 Agenda, these frameworks can and must guide action. Implementing these can help mobilize a revitalized Global Partnership for Sustainable Development with collaboration across levels, sectors and geographies. Further, it is crucial to ask how human mobility directly contributes to other international processes – for example, the Paris Agreement, Our Common Agenda, various efforts to support AIDS, and many others – and take action on these links.

**Box 1: The Global Compact for Migration, SDGs and migration governance for development**

The Global Compact for Migration is rooted in the 2030 Agenda, and fundamental to discussions on how to leverage mobility for development. It aims to leverage the potential of migration for the achievement of SDGs, and enable migrants to enrich societies through their human, economic and social capital.<sup>xvii</sup> The Global Compact acknowledges that addressing human mobility effectively requires coherent and wide-ranging responses. The International Migration Review Forum (IMRF), aiming to review progress made against the Compact, also reviews SDG-mobility progress. In the 2022 IMRF Progress Declaration, states committed to doubling down on implementing the comprehensive agenda. The Compact guides actors on good migration governance, serving as a blueprint for action on mobility and sustainable development that directly contributes to the achievement of the 2030 Agenda. The United Nations system is committed to supporting the implementation, follow-up and review of the Global Compact, and to this end, established a Network on Migration to ensure system-wide support to countries. The Global Compact provides in the mobility-development debate with a very concrete “how”: a plan and toolbox to move forwards with.

**Mobility dynamics are not just shaped by migration policies, but also by policies in other areas – from agriculture to urban design and public health – that may not seem directly related to migration.**

For example, trade policies can impact livelihoods in a local area, later increasing emigration flows.<sup>xviii</sup> To effectively manage human mobility for development, all relevant policies need to be aligned in terms of policy coherence. Decisions to move are influenced by contextual and interconnected factors and shaped by sustainable development, impacts of climate change and environmental degradation, peace and security, and migration pathways. A systems approach is therefore needed to address drivers, linking humanitarian, development and peace considerations. In practice, however, many policies do not take a systems approach or consider interlinkages, targeting individual mobility drivers instead,<sup>xix</sup> often with counterproductive results. There is a need to join up the dots across areas of policy making – similar to how gender and climate change are now recognised as cross-cutting issues – and empower more policymakers and other stakeholders to “speak migration”.

This applies not only across policy domains, but also across levels of governance, and between countries.

**Acting on mobility-development links requires close collaboration between national and local levels.**

Empowering local leaders and working directly with communities, cities and rural governments creates development solutions that work on the ground in real time, crucial to implementing what may otherwise seem abstract ideas. Further, mobility and development policy requires strong cooperation across countries. People cross borders and affect different countries simultaneously; however, a real sense of mutuality in international cooperation on migration is often missing. The universal lens of the SDGs facilitates the development connections of mobility in countries of origin, transit and destination, for example, allowing policymakers in high-income countries to not only consider them an instrument of bilateral cooperation, but also desirable in domestic policies. This will go a long way to increase the impact of policies across the board. To leverage the opportunities that human mobility brings, public mindsets need to change. Still too often, myths dominate. Often human mobility is

sensationalized and migrants dehumanised. It can be difficult to communicate nuance and change mindsets, particularly in bumpy political waters. However, if mobility is to be harnessed for development in neighbourhoods, cities and countries around the world, and if truly we mean to leave no one behind, migrants cannot remain scapegoats that provide short-term political fodder. While it dates from 2015, how migration is treated in the 2030 Agenda represents a progressive understanding of human mobility that, almost ten years later, seems sadly unrecognized in national politics. This must change.

What can be done? There is no need to reinvent the wheel; the 2030 Agenda and the Global Compact for Migration must be implemented. Doing this would bring us closer to achieving our shared goals for 2030, as well as leverage the links between mobility and development. Moreover, mobility in all of its forms must be integrated across development, humanitarian and many other efforts, including by following the action recommended in this document. Doing this would bring alive various mobility-development links, and surely enough, help achieve the 2030 Agenda. Whichever way it is looked at, human mobility is part of the solution to rescue the SDGs. The upcoming SDG Summit marks a halfway point to 2030; the full spectrum of human mobility must be incorporated into discussions and outcomes, including key commitments to accelerate the contribution of human mobility to development, in this most urgent Decade of Action.

With the right tools, human mobility can help fulfil the aspirations of those on the move, those who stay behind, and the societies they join.<sup>xx</sup> While mobility is already recognized as a key part of the 2030 Agenda; this document outlines steps to act on this commitment, and provides practical suggestions for policy interventions to achieve transformation. Put simply, the 2030 Agenda cannot be achieved without weaving human mobility into our responses. Comprehensively considering how migrants can support the world’s road map ahead to save people and planet is not only the right thing to do, but the smart thing to do. This is ambitious, transformational and wholly possible.



# ACCELERATION ACTIONS FOR DEVELOPMENT

Acceleration Actions are initiatives proposed by IOM to accelerate SDG implementation in this Decade of Action. They leverage how mobility can support sustainable development to push forward achievement on a wide variety of Goals. Addressing the interlinked nature of the 2030 Agenda, together they address drivers to end poverty, protect the planet, ensure that all people enjoy peace and prosperity and much more. For each Action, governments, individually or in partnership, can build on existing innovative practices.

The driving force behind these Actions is connection. They are relevant to policy areas which often

operate separately, bringing new connections for the consideration of policymakers. This is reflected in the mix of SDGs each Action supports; many are not often seen in the same sentence. The Actions also aim to connect countries and communities. They are universally relevant, giving a role to play to countries in all regions, across income levels. Finally, they knit together several cross-cutting elements of mobility and development policy, which must be connected to all interventions (see Box 2). Acknowledging these mutually reinforcing connections through policy would be transformative, allowing mobility to act as an accelerator to advance the 2030 Agenda.

## Box 2: Gender, youth and data: crucial to transformative action

**Gender** affects every stage of the migration process, shaping the motives, consequences and experiences of migration for all individuals, from men to women, boys, girls and persons identifying as lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and intersex (LGBTI) people. Further, it interacts with human mobility's impacts on development. For example, while the majority of those trafficked for sexual exploitation have historically been women, the proportion of male victims is rising.<sup>xxi</sup>

Using a gender-responsive perspective in all aspects of migration governance is more crucial today than ever, with violence against women and many other inequalities on the rise.<sup>xxii</sup> To truly leave no one behind, there is a need to work towards gender equality among migrants, address gender-based violence and vulnerabilities during migration processes and remain gender-responsive throughout action. Further, it is key to use intersectional approaches to consider where gender interacts with other factors like age or disability to shape individuals' experiences.

Moreover, addressing the intersection of migration and gender can support development outcomes. For example, gender parity for labour force participation reversed in 2020, while labour participation rates of migrant women are higher than for non-migrant women, and migrant domestic workers can help non-migrant women enter or re-enter the labour force.<sup>xxiii</sup> Further, women labour migrants tend to remit a higher proportion of their incomes, sending money more regularly and for longer periods of time.<sup>xxiv</sup> Using gender analysis can help develop more durable responses to environmental migration.<sup>xxv</sup> While addressing the needs of all genders is key to enhancing the benefits of mobility, only 69 per cent out of 111 countries have mechanisms to ensure migration policies are gender-responsive.<sup>xxvi</sup> This proportion should increase fast; the sooner a gender-responsive lens is used in migration governance, the sooner the world will collectively reach the SDGs.

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There are 1.8 billion **young people** aged between 10 and 24, the largest youth generation in history, and 90 per cent of these live in developing countries.<sup>xxvii</sup>

The educational and other needs of this group are not all being met: if current trends continue, 300 million children or youth who attend school will not be able to read and write by 2030.<sup>xxviii</sup> These and other trends intersect with migration. Around 11 per cent of international migrants are aged 15 to 24<sup>xxix</sup> and younger migrants are pivotal to how human mobility contributes to development; approximately one in ten migrant workers in 2019 was 15 to 24 years old.<sup>xxx</sup> How young people navigate their transition into adulthood is critical for the progress of people and planet,<sup>xxxi</sup> and higher numbers than ever go through this transition as migrants, or are affected by mobility in other ways, such as by having an emigrant parent, or as potential, would-be migrants themselves.

Provided with the opportunities to reach their potential, young people can not only help drive innovation, development, peace and security, but support well-managed human mobility. To do so, it is critical to include supporting young people's well-being and empowerment through access to decent work, skills development, and services in rural and urban areas-and including migrant youth throughout these efforts. Migrant youth may have different additional needs, for example specific training or educational opportunities.

With the right tools at their disposal, youth can transform action to accelerate SDG achievement. However, their agency to do this is not a given, as youth remain almost invisible in policymaking and decision-making.<sup>xxxii</sup> To change this, the international community must support the expansion and strengthening of youth participation in decision-making at all levels, and focus on the concerns of future generations, including through the Summit of the Future and Pact for Future Generations. Only by engaging and partnering with youth will the world be able to achieve peace, security, justice, climate resilience and sustainable development;<sup>xxxiii</sup> and migrant youth are a key part of the puzzle.

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There has been impressive progress on **data on human mobility** in recent years; there are new methodologies to measure migrant recruitment costs, migration governance and many other topics.<sup>xxxiv</sup> So, what does the official data on migration in the SDGs tell us?<sup>xxxv</sup>

#### Indicator 10.7.2



In 2021, **63 per cent of 138 countries** had a wide range of policies to facilitate orderly, safe, regular and responsible migration and mobility of people.

#### Indicator 10.7.3.



IOM recorded **54,127 deaths on migratory routes** worldwide since 2015, and 6,878 in 2022. However, this figure is based on recorded deaths and the actual number is likely much higher.

#### Indicator 10.7.4.



The number of people displaced from their countries due to war, conflict, persecution, human rights violations and public disorder was **32 million people in 2022**, and the ratio of refugees to every 100,000 people was 398.

Despite these useful data points, overall the evidence base on migration and development is patchy. Migrants are often invisible in official SDG data – in 2022, the global SDG database disaggregated only one indicator by migratory status – and on average, only 55% of countries report on SDG migration indicators.<sup>xxxvi</sup> Poor data is not limited to migration; while progress has been made in improving wider SDG data, there are still significant gaps in geographic coverage, timeliness, and disaggregation. For example, for 9 of the 17 SDGs, only around half of the total 193 countries or areas have internationally comparable data since 2015.<sup>xxxvii</sup> Closing data gaps is a priority for the UN system, and mobility data must be integrated in efforts to do this. Much better information on mobility and its links to development is needed to support action. For example, age- and gender- disaggregated data are critical to leave no migrant behind, and stronger data around climate events can help actors anticipate which populations may be at risk, and mitigate fallout as far as possible. There are innovative examples to build on: the COVID-19 pandemic has been linked to data innovation, new data partnerships, and increased use of big data to understand mobility dynamics.<sup>xxxviii</sup>



In Bangladesh, IOM implements participatory approaches such as Communicating with Communities to ensure communities are put at the centre of the response.  
© IOM 2016 / Amanda Nero



## Extend social protection and universal health coverage to all migrants, to reduce inequalities and vulnerabilities and enable their active participation in and contribution to societies



Social protection and universal health coverage (UHC) are fundamental building blocks of resilient and inclusive societies, and key to meeting the SDGs. However, many people on the move have little or no access to either,<sup>xxxix</sup> leading to precarious situations and a limited ability to contribute to origin and destination communities. The pandemic highlighted the vital importance of social protection and health coverage. In its aftermath, there is a need to rethink how to design and deliver assistance more inclusively. Extending social protection and health coverage to migrants could drive progress on SDGs 1, 3, 5, 10 and 17.

### What do we know?

**Migrants tend to enjoy less social protection and health coverage.** Only 30 per cent of 144 Bilateral Labour Agreements (BLAs) and Memorandum of Understanding (MoUs) on migration include social security provisions, including for health care.<sup>xi</sup> Due to different restrictions, many migrants have no access to social protection; **approximately 22 per cent of labour migrants are not covered and 55 per cent cannot transfer their benefits home or to another country,**<sup>xii</sup> leading to poorer health outcomes. Despite several international legal instruments recognizing the right to health for everyone, migrants have the same access to health services as nationals in half of 84 countries surveyed in a study, while in 37 per cent equal access is contingent on migrants' legal status.<sup>xiii</sup>

**Approximately 22 per cent of labour migrants are not covered and 55 per cent cannot transfer their benefits home or to another country**

Even if migrants are entitled to social protection or health coverage, in practice take-up can be low given practical, administrative or other barriers. Some subgroups face particular issues despite facing higher risks, such as refugees, IDPs, short-term migrants, informal workers and those in irregular situations.<sup>xiv</sup> Gender is an additional factor impacting access; for example, only 43 per cent of 163 countries provide social protection for domestic workers, and of those only 14 per cent to migrant domestic workers, a group often facing barriers.<sup>xv</sup> While there is universal health-care coverage in Thailand as well as several initiatives to access “hard-to-reach” migrants, approximately 800,000 irregular migrants remain uncovered.<sup>xvi</sup>

**Expanding access would help reduce inequalities.** Migrants are often at higher risk of poverty and poorer health outcomes, in part due to the conditions surrounding their migration process.<sup>xvii</sup> Across the European Union, 25 per cent of the foreign-born versus 16 per cent of the native born live below the poverty line, and migrants face challenges in occupational health worldwide.<sup>xviii</sup> Adjusting social protection and health coverage to serve migrants can help reduce poverty, improve health and education outcomes, boost integration and is linked to greater social inclusion and cohesion.<sup>xlix</sup> This can be done by expanding eligibility and tackling barriers. In practice, many migrants depend on informal support mechanisms<sup>l</sup> – while these should not substitute formal protection measures, programmes could leverage

**Across the European Union, 25 per cent of the foreign-born versus 16 per cent of the native born live below the poverty line**

some aspects of these, such as migrants' networks.

**This would maximize migrants' participation and contributions.** As many countries scale back social spending in response to fiscal pressures, it is key to remember that migrants often help sustain these systems. **Migrants tend to contribute more in taxes and social contributions than they receive.**<sup>li</sup> In Switzerland, halving migration would cause the national social security system to go bankrupt by 2027.<sup>lii</sup> In Portugal, migrants' social security contributions are proportionally greater than those from non-migrants,

and reached 1.3 billion Euros in 2021.<sup>liii</sup> Limiting welfare and health spending could have negative effects; restricting asylum seeker and refugee health-care access leads to higher long-term costs, while extending primary care brings savings.<sup>liv</sup> Health-care access can increase employment, earnings and productivity,<sup>lv</sup> and equal access is linked to growth. Moving forward, there is a need to consider how these topics interact with other issues, such as climate change, mobility drivers and rural transformation.<sup>lvi</sup> For example, social protection can be embedded into climate, shocks and displacement responses to improve outcomes.<sup>lvii</sup>

### What could be the impact?

#### Extending health system access to migrants could help reduce a range of vulnerabilities, facilitating their full participation and contributions to society.

In Colombia, migrants often have lower access to health care compared to natives;<sup>1</sup> migrants are 39 percentage points less likely to be affiliated with a health programme than Colombians.



This overlaps with other inequalities migrants face. Migrants in employment are 35 percentage points less likely to have the right to severance pay; 32 percentage points less likely to have the right to paid leave for vacations, and 31 percentage points less likely to have the right to paid sick leave compared to Colombians.



Migrants also faced greater vulnerabilities as a result of the COVID-19 pandemic, being 5 percentage points more likely to have had problems finding food or cleaning products and 3 percentage points more likely to have lost their job or source of income as a result of the pandemic compared to Colombians.



There is a link between migrants' health system affiliation and vulnerability related to the pandemic. Migrants who are affiliated are 4 percentage points less likely to have problems finding food or cleaning products as a result of the pandemic, and 2 percentage points less likely to lose their job or source of income because of the pandemic.

1 Analysis based on data from 2023 from the Colombian Gran Encuesta Integrada de Hogares (GEIH).

## What has been done?

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In Sri Lanka, the Ministry of Health introduced a mandatory social protection plan for all residence visa applicants. Under the Health Protection Plan, applicants undergo a health assessment, and residence visa holders are entitled to a health check-up and several health benefits including emergency care, primary outpatient care and treatment for diseases identified in the assessment.<sup>miii</sup>

In Ukraine, IOM implements a range of mental health and psychosocial support (MHPSS) activities that support people, including IDPs, returnees, third-country nationals and host communities, to regain a sense of safety and human security, encourages the creation or reactivation of social networks, helps deal with past and ongoing stressors, and strengthens overall resilience of individuals affected by the war.

## What can be done to get there?

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- › Provide universal access for all migrants to safe, quality and affordable health services, medicines and continuity of care, to achieve universal health coverage; incorporate the health needs of people on the move in policies, strategies and plans; strengthen the capacity of health systems and enhance vertical coherence to ensure they are inclusive, equitable, resilient, and migration-sensitive; ensure migrants have access to financial risk protection, such as insurance coverage, to prevent excessive health expenditures.
- › Extend inclusive and non-discriminatory national social protection systems, including social protection floors for all migrants; develop frameworks, policies and practices to remove obstacles to social protection; and leverage innovative informal social protection schemes as complements to formal social protection where appropriate and feasible.
- › Conclude bilateral and multilateral social security agreements and bilateral labour migration agreements along key migration corridors and within regional groupings.

- › During crisis and post-crisis (e.g. pandemics, disasters), strengthen coordination between national, subnational and local/community authorities to enhance accessibility of social protection and health care for all; work closely with humanitarian actors to ensure transition measures from cash-based systems towards sustainable social protection systems.

## 2

## Reduce remittance costs and leverage different types of diaspora contributions to boost sustainable development finance, trade systems and global value chains



The world urgently needs ambitious and creative plans to finance sustainable development. It would take less than 1 per cent of global finance to fill the SDG funding gap,<sup>lx</sup> and human mobility can help provide solutions to do this. Meanwhile, the human, financial and other capital which diaspora members contribute can support trade systems and global value chains (GVCs), which in turn play a key role in trade, inclusive growth and job creation around the world. If managed effectively, migrants' knowledge transfer and many other contributions can help boost trade and GVCs, leveraging these for progress. Human mobility can strengthen both GVCs and development financing to help achieve SDGs 1, 2, 3, 4, 8, 10 and 17.

### What do we know?

**Remittances finance sustainable development.** In 2022, remittances to developing countries reached USD 647 billion,<sup>lx</sup> representing the largest source of external finance flows to low-and middle-income countries (LMICs) other than China, at about three times the volume of official development assistance. Moreover, informal transfers may range between 280–600 billion US dollars.<sup>lxi</sup> While some economic effects of these transfers are debated, they have undeniably supported global development: without remittances, the proportion of the poor would be **4 per cent higher in Nepal, 5 per cent higher in Ghana, 5–7 per cent higher in Cambodia, 10 per cent higher in Bangladesh, 11 per cent higher in Uganda and 12 per cent higher in El Salvador.**<sup>lxii</sup> Remittances

**In 2022, remittances to developing countries reached USD 647 billion**

can bring educational, health and other benefits and support productive investments.<sup>lxiii</sup> Further, they help stabilize macroeconomic volatility by financing current account deficits, and act as insurance during crises or after disasters.<sup>lxiv</sup> They can also present a useful source of foreign currency and assets in countries' Balance of Payments. However, they remain expensive. **The average cost of sending USD 200 of remittances was 6.3 per cent in 2022**, over double the SDG target of 3 per cent.<sup>lxv</sup> While these private funds cannot replace public spending, reducing remittance costs would increase their volume to directly help finance development in origin countries.

**Diasporas boost trade systems and development financing.** Through the human capital that diasporas bring, mobility stimulates trade by removing informational, communication and cultural barriers.<sup>lxvi</sup> Migrants' knowledge can increase trade in goods and services by improving market access, increasing demand and lowering transactions costs as they help connect firms with buyers overseas.<sup>lxvii</sup> For example, African diasporas play a key role promoting regional exports.<sup>lxviii</sup> Diasporas also use their human and financial capital to support origin countries' productivity. For example, through skills and technology transfer, trade and entrepreneurship, diasporas from the Republic of Korea led to increases in domestic income. Diasporas also provide knowledge for many of India's high-value inventions.<sup>lxix</sup> Further, migrants can catalyse foreign direct investment and development in capital markets, by diversifying the investor base and introducing new financial products and sources of funding.<sup>lxx</sup> Policy can help boost outcomes; **in 2019, remittances received in countries with an agency for emigration and diaspora policies were on average**


7.3 per cent of GDP, and 3.3 per cent for those without such an agency.<sup>lxxi</sup>

**Regular migration pathways are central to Global Value Chains (GVCs).** Labour mobility is integral to GVCs, as foreign workers are associated with higher-quality products, more trade, and more effective global value chains.<sup>lxxii</sup> Migrants can help countries advance in GVCs.<sup>lxxiii</sup> Often this occurs thanks to migrants' transnational knowledge that helps establish cross-border supply chain linkages. **For instance, a 10 per cent increase in migrant workers raises a company's probability of sourcing inputs from their origin**

**countries by 0.2 per cent.**<sup>lxxiv</sup> Migration pathways that are safe and regular, especially when they are linked to labour markets, are crucial to meaningful GVC participation. To enable this, policies pertaining to labour mobility, education and skills development need to align; for example, training investment cannot boost GVC performance if policies do not attract foreign students.<sup>lxxv</sup> Promoting intraregional skills mobility could improve sub-Saharan Africa's integration in manufacturing GVCs. Furthermore, public-private collaboration can help integrate labour standards across GVCs and establish new skills partnerships that consider market needs.<sup>lxxvi</sup>

### What could be the impact?

#### Decreasing the cost of sending remittances could considerably boost amounts of money sent.



On average, **a decrease in the cost of remittances by 1 percentage point** is associated with a 0.21 per cent increase in the total amount of remittances received in low- and middle-income countries (LMICs).<sup>2</sup> In small island developing States (SIDS) – which face structural issues in securing predictable and sustainable financing for development – a decrease in the cost of remittances by 1 percentage point is associated with a 0.50 per cent increase in the total amount of remittances received.

If the current cost of remittances decreased by 5 percentage points, bringing it closer to the SDG target of 3 per cent on average across corridors, this would mean in practice an **extra USD 6.88 billion being sent to households in LMICs per year. For SIDS, this would mean an extra USD 560 million.** By 2030, this would add up to an additional USD 41.25 billion received in LMICs and USD 3.36 billion in SIDS.<sup>3</sup>

In many countries, **remittances make up a significant proportion of GDP**, and they are regularly used by receiving individuals and families to help cover needs such as those related to health or education. While remittances remain private flows and should not substitute government interventions, they form one part of the ecosystem of financing for development.

Migration can support trade by boosting international exports. Across Central America, North America and the Caribbean, **a 1 per cent rise in migrant stock in a country is associated with a 0.23 per cent increase in exports on average.**<sup>4</sup> This is equivalent to an estimated increase of USD 7,751 in exports per additional migrant.

<sup>2</sup> Analysis based on data from Remittances Prices Worldwide (RPW) and KNOMAD, latest data available from 2021 and 2022, as of July 2023.

<sup>3</sup> If costs were reduced from 2024–2029, inclusive.

<sup>4</sup> Analysis based on migration and trade data over 1990–2020, from the CEPII Gravity Database, IMF DOTS and UN DESA.



## What has been done?

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In 2021, the Government of Mali adopted the Strategy to Promote Productive Investment by the Malian Diaspora. This aims to engage the human, economic and financial capital of the diaspora in the development of Mali, including by providing information to potential diaspora investors.<sup>lxvii</sup>

In the Republic of Moldova, IOM convenes a multi-year joint programme to be implemented with UNDP, UNICEF and WHO that will leverage the positive impacts of migration on development, by strengthening capacities of public authorities. This involves unlocking the potential of diaspora members in areas from telemedicine and the justice sector to innovation and public finance.

IOM invests in programmes, instruments and platforms that proactively engage diaspora to become investors in the peace and development of their communities of origin; and that transfer and connect knowledge and human capital for innovation in local development and entrepreneurship in countries of origin. For instance, the Mobi-TRE initiative implemented in regions of Tunisia characterized by high unemployment, leverages investments from members of the Tunisian diaspora based in Italy for business and jobs creation that can stabilize disadvantaged communities: 60 per cent of the newly created jobs thus far are for workers between the ages of 18 and 30, and a majority of whom (76 per cent) are women.

## What can be done to get there?

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- › Address barriers to free movement to boost both cross-border and regional trade of goods and services, and local and regional value chains.
- › Build programmes that proactively engage diaspora members to become investors in peace and development of their origin communities; direct remittances to productive investment; and transfer knowledge for innovation and entrepreneurship in countries of origin, in particular to support the green transition; to achieve all of these actions, consider establishing a dedicated government


agency responsible for emigration and diaspora policies.

- › Establish an enabling environment to reduce the costs of remittances in line with SDG target 10.c; including through policy and regulatory frameworks; promoting innovation and competition of non-bank service providers; and working with industry stakeholders to scale innovative solutions for remittances.
- › Adopt multi-stakeholder strategies to strengthen migrant worker protection across production and services, including for small and medium-sized enterprises.

# 3



## Weave human mobility into development and urban planning, to increase social cohesion and boost development for all



Today 41 per cent of citizens around the world feel that their sense of social cohesion is weak.<sup>lxxxviii</sup> When cohesion is threatened, taking a whole-of-society approach to development and including everyone’s voices and priorities is critical. Further, listening to migrants’ voices would help improve cohesion, combating negative perception of migration. This is especially relevant in cities – 5 billion people will live in urban areas by 2050, displacement is increasingly urban, and city infrastructure will need to adapt accordingly.<sup>lxxxix</sup> Including migrants and mobility in decision-making can boost cohesion and effectiveness of development interventions, in line with the New Urban Agenda. Finally, it is key to remember that local solutions lead to national change. Working closely with municipal and rural governments and upscaling what works already well in those communities is crucial to sustainable interventions. Integrating human mobility in development planning could drive progress on SDGs 2, 4, 5, 8, 9, 10 and 17.

### What do we know?

**Migrants’ integration in politics and policy efforts is patchy.** Political participation and representation of migrants tends to be low, and in fact migrants have no right to vote in at least 31 countries out of 56 studied.<sup>lxxx</sup> In two out of three OECD countries, migrants are less likely to join voluntary organizations than non-migrants.<sup>lxxxii</sup> Some countries integrate mobility considerations into policy planning. For example, 33 out of 89 countries studied formally engage members

**Migrants have no right to vote in at least 31 countries out of 56 studied**

of diaspora in development policy, and migrants are regularly consulted by governments in 12 out of 56 countries studied.<sup>lxxxii</sup> However, this does not always entail meaningful participation-consultations sometimes involve only surface-level input or hold little benefit for migrants.<sup>lxxxiii</sup>

**Including migrant voices boosts cohesion and strengthens policies.** Migrant participation and consultation on policies that affect them can strengthen integration and inclusion, boosting cohesion.<sup>lxxxiv</sup> In addition, the effectiveness of policies can improve with the participation of different segments of society.<sup>lxxxv</sup> Migrants can introduce new information that policymakers were not aware of to support programmes, and may be more likely to comply with policies over which they feel ownership.<sup>lxxxvi</sup> For example, in 1992 Guatemalan refugees in Mexico negotiated an agreement between both countries that could not have been secured otherwise. Not including migrants can be risky; for example, the relatively low uptake of jobs provided by the 2016 Jordan Compact is linked to a lack of refugee consultations, which would have revealed that many jobs offered were far from refugees’ homes.<sup>lxxxviii</sup> Migrant voices can be meaningfully included through councils at national or city level, and transnational city networks can share related experiences. Greater co-design and co-ownership of policies would boost outcomes; for example, seven NGO partners helped manage Canada’s labour mobility pathway, connecting refugees and employers.<sup>lxxxix</sup>

**Considering human mobility creates more effective development plans.** 29 out of 92 countries studied aligned their national migration strategy with national

development strategies.<sup>xc</sup> Countries are increasingly integrating migration considerations into development planning. Examples of this can be seen in the Republic of Moldova, Mozambique and the Philippines.<sup>xcii</sup> While mobility is most often woven into plans through focus on remittances or diaspora engagement, in fact, migration interacts with many other topics such as food security<sup>xciii</sup> and income. Integrating mobility considerations into programmes across development topics is vital to their success. This is especially true in urban areas, since cities are at the front line of

mobility dynamics and responses; 65 per cent of SDG targets are linked to local government activity.<sup>xciii</sup> Acting on mobility-development links requires close collaboration between national and local levels. Using participatory approaches can support displacement responses in cities, and integrating urban migrants' perspectives into policy is linked with more effective, sustainable and legitimate solutions. For example, working with displaced communities when upgrading informal settlements in Medellín enabled safer living conditions.<sup>xciv</sup>

## What could be the impact?

### Including the voices of diaspora members pays off.

In the Republic of Moldova, a UNDP project to mainstream human mobility into development boosted efforts to extend basic services and job creation in local communities.<sup>xcv</sup> New partnerships were created between village residents, members of the diaspora, local government and hometown associations, to improve water quality, invest in rural tourism businesses, provide direct support during the COVID-19 pandemic, and much more.



As a result, at least **300,000 people benefited from improved local basic services, and 180 private sector beneficiaries benefited from financial and technical support.** Approximately 700 jobs were created at the local level.

### Including the voices of displaced populations pays off.

Between 2015 and 2020, communities across Iraq signed local peace agreements (LPAs) to set the foundations for peaceful relations between IDPs and their 'home' communities. One study explored eight such LPAs.<sup>xcvi</sup>



It found that a **failure to include IDPs directly in LPA negotiations potentially undermined sustainability of IDP return**, and the inclusion of women, youth and civil society contributed to the sustainability of returns. Meanwhile, indirect representation of IDPs, through tribal leadership, enabled negotiations to occur that would otherwise have been impossible.



Including displaced persons in peacebuilding and development plans could not only help ensure the **1.2 million current IDPs in Iraq, and the more than 100 million forcibly displaced globally**, are not left behind, but also support efforts to build cohesive societies.

## What has been done?

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Malta created an Inter-Ministerial Committee and Forum on Integration Opportunities to encourage migrant participation in decision-making. Portugal created a Council for Migration, partially composed of representatives from migrant communities and migrant-focused organizations, to participate in policymaking.<sup>xcvii</sup>

The joint IOM-UNDP Global Programme on Making Migration Work for Sustainable Development (M4SD), has pioneered a methodology to mainstream migration for policy coherence since 2008. The programme contributes to over 30 SDG targets and indicators, including by empowering governments to integrate human mobility into more than 21 national and local policies. It follows an innovative policy-into-practice model, helping translate these policies into concrete communities initiatives. It is implemented in Bangladesh, Ecuador, Jamaica, Kyrgyzstan, Morocco, the Republic of Moldova, Nepal, the Philippines, Senegal, Serbia, and Tunisia.

The Mayors Mechanism co-steered by IOM, United Cities and Local Government and the Mayors Mechanism Council was established in 2018. It is a prime model of a partnership and collaboration space, forging links between States, cities and local/regional governments as well as civil society, the private sector, the United Nations system and other international and regional organizations. In 2022, the Mayors Mechanism launched a Call to Local Action for Migrants and Refugees in partnership with the United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) which invites local and regional governments to share knowledge, create partnerships and upscale good practices in support of the Compacts to continue to engage local authorities as essential partners in the quest for sustainable development inclusive of mobility.

## What can be done to get there?

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- › Holistically address the needs of communities by integrating mobility considerations across multiple sectors of community life, including health, employment, housing, education and more.

- › Empower local leaders; allow communities and governments to decide their own solutions; build from existing good practices in communities, scaling up and co-financing services and community organizations so that they can have bigger impact.
- › Create new spaces for sectors and levels of government to exchange and collaborate in to help ensure horizontal and vertical policy coherence; create similar spaces that include migrants and local residents across communities.
- › Prioritize funding and support for communities co-creating new solutions to social cohesion, peace and development challenges with migrants; work with the media, private sector, educational institutions and community centres to create bridges within and across communities.



## Develop safe and regular migration pathways, invest in skills development and facilitate mutual recognition of qualifications, to meet the needs of changing labour markets and divergent demographic trends



Migrants bring with them skills that are in demand in destination communities, supporting sectors where labour is in short supply. Nevertheless, today many migrants work in jobs unsuited to their level of qualifications and experience,<sup>xcviii</sup> and despite shortages in specific skills around the world, education, training and mobility policies are not always responsive to these. Investing in smarter skills development and facilitating recognition of migrants' skills could drive progress on SDGs 2, 6, 7, 10, 11, 16 and 17.

### What do we know?

**Effective skills and mobility policies sustain productive labour markets.** Skills training that matches job requirements improves productivity and growth. This means that as labour markets become increasingly global, there is a dual need to invest in skills that are in demand domestically and globally<sup>xcix</sup> and craft mobility programmes that support their circulation. These actions support destination countries: high labour shortages can cost businesses more than 1 trillion USD a year.<sup>c</sup> Conversely, they also contribute to origin communities, as the emigration of educated workers is linked to “brain gain”<sup>ci</sup> – increased rates of those who are highly skilled. Policies are needed to fill in the gaps; the proportion of youth not in education, employment or training (NEET) is at an all-time high of 23.5 per cent,<sup>cii</sup> and there are already significant skills gaps related to the green transition, which could create 24 million jobs by 2030.<sup>ciii</sup> Skills mobility

**The proportion of youth not in education, employment or training (NEET) is at an all-time high of 23.5 per cent**

partnerships that invest in vocational training can offer a quadruple win in this context, improving migrant's skills, helping employers and destination countries meet skill shortages, and contributing to development in origin countries.<sup>civ</sup>

**Migrants' skills are often not formally recognized; changing this would benefit all.** The average overqualification rate of native-born workers in the European Union is 21 per cent; it is 33 per cent for the foreign-born.<sup>cv</sup> **In the European Union, almost 60 per cent of employed tertiary-educated refugees are overqualified for their jobs, more than twice the level of the native-born.**<sup>cv</sup> This costs migrants and destination communities alike, and migrants' contributions are larger when they can work at level of their experience. Overqualified workers face lower wages and job satisfaction, poorer mental health and are linked to higher turnover.<sup>cvii</sup> Improving recognition of qualifications enhances efficiency, facilitates the flow of goods and services, decreases skills wastage and attracts skilled migrants.<sup>cviii</sup> After qualification recognition reforms in Australia, the rate of migrant nurses employed in their field rose from 41 per cent to 66 per cent from 1996 to 2006–2011, that of migrant doctors from 41 to 57 per cent, and that of migrant engineers from 17 to 29 per cent.<sup>cx</sup> In Sweden, formal degree recognition made migrants 4.4 per cent more likely to be employed and increased their wages.<sup>cx</sup>

**Better skills development and recognition can equip countries for diverse demographic changes.** By 2050, older persons will outnumber children under five, youth and adolescents,<sup>cx</sup> and demand for health-care workers will increase to create a potential **shortfall of 15 million workers by 2030.**<sup>cxii</sup> As migrants are already

the backbone of many countries' health systems, mobility of health-care workers can ease the burden of elderly care and support ageing economies. Similarly, skills development policies will be pivotal for Africa to leverage its approaching "demographic dividend," a relative increase in the working-age population that offers significant opportunity for accelerated growth

and for which accelerated human capital investment and job creation is needed. Moving forward, countries can better match global labour supply and demand by investing in the development of their most needed skills and creating corresponding legal pathways for migrants.

### What could be the impact?

#### Across countries, migrants already cushion the challenges of several demographic changes and contribute to economic growth.



It has been projected that the **15-64-year-old population in OECD economies will decrease by -0.6 per cent between 2023 and 2030.**<sup>cxiv</sup> Without migrants, in other words halting all migration flows to OECD countries until then, the population would instead decrease by 4 per cent.



Increasing current annual migration flows to OECD countries by 16.5 per cent would fully compensate for the projected demographic deficit. Doing this would lead to additional growth of 0.2 per cent in OECD countries by 2030, adding USD 90 billion to GDP.<sup>5</sup> **By 2030, migrants will contribute an estimated USD 500 billion to OECD economies; around the same as the GDP of Austria.**

### What has been done?

In Canada, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) works with provincial governments, the private sector and civil society to estimate local labour demand. There are programmes to attract migrants with specific skills, managed through an electronic selection system.<sup>cxv</sup>

IOM's (PROMISE) programme in Cambodia, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Myanmar and Thailand works to bring labour migration and skills development issues together. For example, it implements a range of skills training initiatives, in partnership with national skills certification bodies and employers. In India, the eMigrate portal helps connect labour demand and

supply, and protects labour emigrants. Overseas employers dealing with Emigration Check Required (ECR) countries<sup>6</sup> can post their labour needs on the platform, allowing accredited recruitment companies to facilitate migrant placement. It provides model work contracts, links to Grievance Portals and more.

The Joint Programme on Labour Migration Governance for Development and Integration (JLMP) is implemented by the African Union Commission, the International Labour Organization (ILO), and the Economic Commission for Africa, together with IOM. Within this framework, IOM is actively exploring innovative legal pathways, such as the Skills Mobility Partnerships. One of the key objectives of JLMP is to ensure that migrant workers, both in formal and

<sup>5</sup> Analysis based on migration flow data from OECD Migration Database, 2000–2020, population from IIASA/Wittgenstein Centre for Demography and Global Human Capital, GDP data from the World Bank, spending data from World Data Lab-World Data Pro, and capital stock from Penn World Table.

<sup>6</sup> ECR countries: Afghanistan, Bahrain, Indonesia, Iraq, Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, Lebanon, Libya, Malaysia, Oman, Qatar, South Sudan, the Sudan, the Syrian Arab Republic, Thailand, United Arab Emirates and Yemen.

informal sectors, enjoy safe and secure working conditions, have access to portable social protection, and benefit from mutual recognition of their skills and qualifications. The programme takes a comprehensive and integrated approach to skills development and labour mobility, departing from traditional approaches that primarily focus on the interests of destination countries. Instead, it emphasizes the importance of considering the development needs of countries of origin.

The Regional Coordination Mechanism (RCM) on labour migration governance brings together key government and private sector stakeholders from Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan, through the support of IOM. It aims to support the convergence and alignment of national skills classification, standardization and recognition systems, as well as engage in inter-State cooperation on their recognition and legal certification. The RCM includes relevant government representatives such as the Ministries of Labour, Social Affairs, Internal Affairs, representatives of the private sector; technical and vocational education and training institutions, representatives of State recruitment agencies and private recruitment agencies, employers' representatives, civil society and advocates for the rights of migrant workers.

## What can be done to get there?

- › Support and convene relevant public and private stakeholders, including government actors, trade unions, migrant associations and non-governmental organizations, employers and others to create and implement market-driven skills development policies that improve employability while meeting aspirations of people on the move, and distribute relevant costs among stakeholders.
- › Support convergence and alignment of national skills classification, standardization and recognition systems, moving towards common skill taxonomies and harmonization templates, and engage in international cooperation on their recognition.
- › Scale up and replicate innovative tools such as the skills mobility partnerships model as a forward-

looking solution that is centred around cooperative skills development and the building of meaningful partnerships between migrants, States, employers, training and education institutions and civil society in origin and destination communities to share the benefits of labour mobility.

- › Strengthen capacities of institutions to collect and analyse data from administrative and other sources for labour market and mobility analysis; invest in mapping of skills gaps.
- › Facilitate the sustainable reintegration of returning migrants into community life by providing them with equal access to social protection and services, vocational trainings, employment opportunities and decent work, recognition of skills acquired abroad, and financial services. This is done to build upon their entrepreneurship, skills and human capital as active members of society and contributors of sustainable development upon return.

# 5



## Reduce the digital access gap for people on the move, to improve integration and unlock innovative and green entrepreneurship



In a world where the new face of inequality is digital, many migrant populations face limited digital access. At the same time, migrants are more likely to be entrepreneurs. Closing the digital divide would not only decrease inequalities, but allow more migrant-led innovation to flourish. Governments and businesses have not focused enough on how migrants can support a low-carbon future;<sup>cxvi</sup> boosting digitalization and migrants' entrepreneurship could present an opportunity to help address climate change. Reducing the digital access gap could drive progress on SDGs 4, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13 and 17.

### What do we know?

**Migration is linked to innovation and entrepreneurship.** Migrants are disproportionately represented among inventors and in most countries, and self-employment is higher for migrants than for natives.<sup>cxvii</sup> Non-nationals make up a disproportionate share of patent submissions – 38.5 per cent in the United Kingdom, 40.2 per cent in the Kingdom of the Netherlands, 55.7 per cent in the United States, and 87.3 per cent in Canada – and 36 per cent of high-tech companies are founded by migrants.<sup>cxviii</sup> Migrants' diverse skill sets, knowledge, and experiences can boost innovation and productivity in firms,<sup>cxix</sup> and remittances and return migration are often linked to entrepreneurship.<sup>cxx</sup> In some cases, migrants' innovations support the green transition; for example, in Israel the water treatment sector was developed partially thanks to technology and knowledge transfer from the diaspora.<sup>cxxi</sup>

**Digital inequalities hold migrants' entrepreneurship back.** Mobile populations often have lower access to

digital technologies.<sup>cxii</sup> For example, almost 60 million refugees and IDPs do not have reliable internet and mobile connectivity, and refugees are 50 per cent less likely to have an internet-enabled phone than the general population.<sup>cxiii</sup> In the United States, approximately 5 per cent of those who speak English at home have no computer experience, and this rate is almost 21 per cent for migrants who do not speak English at home.<sup>cxxiv</sup> This can be due to cost, digital literacy and other reasons, with some subgroups, such as those who have recently arrived, facing additional barriers.<sup>cxv</sup> Lack of digital access is linked to isolation,<sup>cxvi</sup> and decreased training and education participation.<sup>cxvii</sup> Reducing the digital access gap is vital to enable migrant inclusion and integration, as it facilitates access to information on basic needs such as housing, employment, education and health, access to social networks, government e-services, language training and many forms of digital learning as well as job-seeking opportunities.<sup>cxviii</sup> Digital cooperation discussions should place greater focus on people on the move.<sup>cxix</sup>

**Almost 60 million refugees and IDPs do not have reliable internet and mobile connectivity**

**Increasing digitalization can drive green entrepreneurship.** Digitalization can expand entrepreneurial financing options, particularly for those with poor access to formal finance. For example, in China access to digital finance increased migrants' propensity towards entrepreneurship.<sup>cxx</sup> Digitalization of remittances can help migrants save more, and higher savings are linked to migrant entrepreneurship.<sup>cxxi</sup> For example, MobileRemit, a mobile remittances channel



in seven African countries, links migrants to services to boost financial inclusion and entrepreneurship.<sup>xxxii</sup> The green transition will require changes across industries and occupations, and for this to happen, innovation is needed. Digital policies can encourage migrants' entrepreneurship to accelerate the transition and support climate action. By supporting migrants in this manner across destination, origin and return countries,

migrants could help make the green transition more inclusive geographically. Finally, the rise of teleworking brings not only productivity gains and reduced CO2 emissions, but new opportunities for workers across borders.<sup>xxxiii</sup> Policy must respond to these changes, leveraging benefits to workers, employers, communities and the environment.<sup>xxxiv</sup>

## What could be the impact?

### Improving migrants' digital access and financial inclusion, two building blocks of entrepreneurship, could help unlock their contributions to society.



In the United Kingdom migrants are 8 percentage points more likely than the UK-born to want to open a business during the next year.<sup>7</sup> Migrants' self-employment is often linked to their digital access; migrants with a mobile phone are 7 percentage points more likely to be self-employed. Increasing digital inclusion could help boost migrants' entrepreneurship; one percentage point increase in migrants' rate of daily internet use is associated with a 4 percentage point increase in the likelihood of being self-employed.



In Kenya, there is a digital divide – migrants are 4 percentage point less likely to have a smartphone than Kenyan-born – as well as a financial access gap – migrants are 19 percentage points less likely to have a bank account.<sup>8</sup> These inequalities are sometimes linked; migrants are 20 percentage points less likely to use mobile phones for financial transactions than Kenyan-born. Increasing migrants' digital access could boost financial inclusion; migrants who use the internet on a daily basis are 38 percentage points more likely to have a bank account than those who use the internet less frequently. **Further, Migrants who use the internet on a daily basis are 31 percentage points more likely to use a mobile phone for financial transactions than those who use the internet less frequently.**

7 Analysis based on data from 2020–2022 from the United Kingdom survey *Understanding Society*.

8 Analysis based on data from 2022 from the Kenyan Demographic and Health Survey (DHS).

## What has been done?

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Uruguay's regulations on migration are publicly available in user-friendly way, through a specialized government website. It contains step-by-step guidance on the migration process, a handbook for returning nationals, information on how to access public health, education and legal services, and job-seeking and language resources.<sup>CXXXV</sup>

The Resilience Innovation Facility, also known as Fab-Lab, was established by IOM and other partners as a space for young innovators in Gaziantep, a major refugee-hosting province in Türkiye. In the Gaziantep University campus, the space is open-door and provides free access to digital tools, equipment and technology, as well as mentorship and courses on innovation, design-thinking and problem-solving.

To broaden the usage of digital platforms and tools for safe, orderly and regular migration, the program Hola America seeks to promote social innovations focused on migration, in order to offer better solutions to the problems encountered by different migrant and refugee communities in Latin America. It enables civil society and private sector partners to showcase their novel approaches and receive seed funding to further develop their business plans for enhanced social impact, systems change and sustainability for solutions executed or expanded in Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, Ecuador, Paraguay, Peru, Uruguay, and Venezuela.

## What can be done to get there?

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- › Ensure that migrants and displaced persons are included in digital cooperation discussions and specifically accounted for in global efforts to measure digital inclusion.
- › Facilitate more inclusive and quality education for hard-to-reach migrants by leveraging digital tools for early childhood development, formal schooling, non-formal education programmes, vocational training, technical education, language training and lifelong learning.

- › Broaden the use of digital platforms and tools to access information and guidance on safe, orderly and regular mobility opportunities, for example explaining entry and admission requirements; as well as tools that encourage engagement of diaspora members.
- › Use technology to simplify and streamline international mobility and entry procedures, while upholding the principle of non-discrimination, respecting the right to privacy and protecting personal data.



## Integrate human mobility into national adaptation and climate change response plans, and invest in preparedness and loss and damages provisions, to forge impactful climate and peace action



Climate change and conflict are existential threats to SDG progress. One quarter of humanity lives in a conflict-affected area, and there were 31.8 million new internal displacements due to weather-related events in 2022.<sup>cxxxvi</sup> These and other affected populations are at high risk of being left behind. The links between climate change, conflict and mobility are complex; acting on these can save lives and aid development, in line with the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, the Sendai framework for Action for Disaster Risk Reduction, and the New Agenda for Peace. Integrating human mobility across humanitarian, peace and development plans could drive progress on SDGs 10, 11, 13, 14, 15, 16 and 17.

### What do we know?

**Policy coherence is crucial to managing climate change, conflict and human mobility.** Comprehensive solutions are needed, including in emergency and post-crisis displacement contexts, that embed strong links among humanitarian, peace and security, and development assistance. Such links lay the foundations for durable solutions, lasting peace and sustainable development. The same goes for climate change, as its indirect effects on human mobility are highly complex, and addressing these requires coherent policy across sectors. For example, climate change-related declines in agricultural productivity can trigger rural–urban migration, leading to increased pressures on cities and labour markets.<sup>cxxxvii</sup> Adapting to these changes requires aligning laws, strategies and plans across policy domains (including climate change, disaster risk reduction and others). Further, health systems suffer shocks as they face the direct and indirect effects of climate change, and are crucial to determining migrant

well-being.<sup>cxxxviii</sup> Moving forward, the resilience of health systems in the context of climate change and mobility must be considered.

**However, there is limited integration of human mobility in relevant frameworks.** Populations on the move are, to varying degrees, considered in high-level peace, climate change and other processes. For example, the New Agenda for Peace recognizes that conflict is a key driver of displacement and highlights the vulnerabilities of displaced people. However, while mobility is increasingly included in climate change policies and frameworks, this is done unevenly. **While 33 of the 40 National Adaptation Plans (NAPs) submitted to the UNFCCC mention one or more forms of human mobility, mobility-related terms** are not used coherently and most plans ignore how mobility can help enhance adaptation (such as through pastoralism, labour migration or planned relocation).<sup>cxxix</sup> Out of 165 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, only 34 (20%) refer to human mobility.<sup>cxl</sup> Out of 156 countries that submitted revised or updated Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) in 2020–2022, only 61 (39%) refer to mobility and only some propose concrete interventions.<sup>cxli</sup> 34 out of 92 countries have a national disaster risk reduction (DRR) strategy with provisions on displacement impacts.<sup>cxlii</sup> Despite its relevance, mobility is still omitted from certain key documents, including SDG 13 and financing agreements such as the Green Climate Fund.<sup>cxliii</sup>

**Out of 165 Intended Nationally Determined Contributions, only 34 (20%) refer to human mobility**

**Integrating mobility considerations is integral to peace and climate change action.** Most of today's major challenges to peace and prosperity – from inequality to terrorism to climate change – are interlinked, meaning that their solutions must be cross-sectoral. In turn, human mobility must be systematically included across plans. DRR saves money and lives – each DRR dollar spent reduces damages by six dollars<sup>cxlv</sup> – and will become more important as climate events increase. To ensure minimal loss of lives due to disasters, early warning systems must ensure universal coverage, including migrants. Doing this may require special considerations, as many migrants live in hazard-prone areas and could be the

first and worst affected; for example, the number of projected earthquake casualties in Türkiye increased from 1 to 26 per cent when accounting for Syrian refugees.<sup>cxlv</sup> Moving forward, climate-change related global frameworks and planning need to recognize and integrate different forms of human mobility. For example, the establishment of the Santiago Network for Loss and Damage institutional arrangements decision is a step forward in strengthening solutions for human mobility in the context of climate change. In the same way, solutions to conflict and insecurity must include people on the move to help sustain peace, and secure longer lasting and more inclusive development outcomes.

## What could be the impact?

### Does including human mobility in a country's NDC have any effect on disaster costs?<sup>9</sup>



- **Kenya and Somalia experienced the same drought event in 2020.** Kenya mentions mobility in its NDC, while Somalia does not. Damages-per-people-affected were lower in Kenya (USD 63 per affected) than in Somalia (USD 158 per affected).
- **Fiji and Tonga experienced the same cyclone in 2020.** Fiji's NDC contains mobility provisions, while Tonga's only includes mentions. Damages-per-affected for Fiji were much lower (USD 82 per affected) than for Tonga (USD 5,000 per affected).
- **Bangladesh and India experienced the same cyclone in 2020.** Bangladesh mentions mobility in its NDCs while India does not. Damages-per-people-affected were lower in Bangladesh (USD 652 per affected) than in Somalia (USD 848 per affected).
- **The Dominican Republic and the United States experienced the same cyclone in 2020.** The Dominican Republic mentions relocation in its NDCs, while the United States does not. Damages-per-people-affected were lower in the former (USD 33,347 per affected) than in the latter (USD 970,094 per affected).

When they were affected by the same climate change-related disaster, countries who had integrated human mobility in their NDCs had lower related disaster costs. Note that these country pairs have different contexts and cannot be directly compared.

<sup>9</sup> These figures are descriptive only, and do not show a statistically significant relationship between a country's mobility integration in NDCs and disaster costs. Data used is from the International Disaster Database (EM-DAT, Centre for Research on the Epidemiology of Disasters) and SLYCAN Trust (2022).

## What has been done?

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In 2018, the Ethiopia Disaster Risk Management Commission released a Humanitarian and Disaster Resilience Plan, addressing the displacement impact of disasters, climate change and conflict. The Plan focuses on IDPs and contains detailed displacement considerations, including providing emergency protection services.<sup>cxlvi</sup>

In Somalia IOM, UNEP and the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) work together to break the climate-conflict cycle and foster a sense of unity among the war-weary communities.

## What can be done to get there?

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- › Integrate human mobility across national and international frameworks, policies and plans on climate change, adaptation, disaster risk reduction and development and build capacities of stakeholders to do this.
- › Strengthen systems to prevent and respond to future crises, including through risk assessments that factor in future climate change impacts to inform mobility programming for preparedness, conflict prevention and resolution, disaster risk reduction and climate change adaptation; develop urban development plans that prepare for mobility; increase bilateral and IFI investments in foresight, early warning, climate adaptation, conflict prevention and peacebuilding.
- › Facilitate the participation of all types of migrants in peace dialogue and processes as well as actions regarding climate change adaptation, mitigation and losses and damages – including across COPs and relevant for SIDS and other countries – by including experts, migrants and their families in assessments and consultations, and their direct input into documents.
- › Provide solutions for people to move, including regular migration pathways from climate vulnerable and disaster-prone areas, while facilitating livelihoods and return and reintegration after crises; as a last resort option, develop rights-based and participatory frameworks so people can move.
- › Promote and roll out durable solutions for displacement such as initiatives that grant, expedite, or waive visas and other entry requirements, including through private sponsorships and family reunification; implement non-return policies to ensure migrants are not returned to origin countries experiencing disasters and violent conflict.

Happy migrated from Malawi to South Africa in search for better opportunities to sustain her family.  
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# LOOKING AHEAD

We often hear about migration's "development potential". This document, however, shows that we are no longer talking about a hypothetical – human mobility is already a force for progress that the international community must leverage to help reach the SDGs. Well-managed human mobility is key to achieving the 2030 Agenda, both for SDG 10.7 on orderly, safe, regular and responsible mobility, as well as more broadly across other Goals.

Today's sobering picture of reversing SDG progress is a clarion call to redouble efforts to leave no one behind and overcome the triple planetary crisis – and to utilize every available solution to achieve this. Meanwhile, as human mobility dynamics continue to evolve in tandem with global trends, it has become clear that we cannot properly respond to any of our challenges without considering them across policy and programming. While migrants are often among the furthest left behind, vulnerable because of abuse, exploitation, discrimination or intersecting inequalities, they simultaneously push forward development, well-being and growth for people and planet in myriad ways.

Our solutions must evolve as rapidly as the world does. It has been pointed out that this generation is equipped with unprecedented knowledge, technologies and resources, and that "breaking through to a better future" demands use of this major advantage.<sup>cxlvii</sup> This rings especially true when it comes to human mobility. Today there is a growing evidence about how, if managed effectively, mobility can bring benefits to individuals, families, communities and societies around the world. With the world now at such an existential crossroads, there is little justification not to act on it. Mainstreaming human mobility considerations into development must gather speed to respond to global threats and take advantage of the opportunities migrants bring; with the right levers, doing so can lead to systemic change. For example, as climate mobility rises, expanded legal pathways will be crucial as part of a broader response. By delineating several mutually reinforcing areas of action to accelerate sustainable

development, this document offers a glimpse of the possible.

We have seen how **six Acceleration Actions** can leverage human mobility for sustainable development and explored operational insights on how to do this effectively. What else can concretely be done so that mobility supports our shared aims for people and planet?

- › **Double down on existing human mobility, sustainable development and other global commitments.** We have the blueprints needed for transformation: the 2030 Agenda, Addis Ababa Action Agenda, Sendai Framework on Disaster Risk Reduction, the Paris Agreement and many others. It is fundamental to achieve progress on these, while including mobile populations and integrating human mobility considerations across these, thereby creating long-lasting solutions to global challenges. Concretely, countries can strengthen the links among all of these frameworks, for example by developing integrated actions plans and deepening ties between review forums.
- › **Commit to and implement mobility-centric frameworks, in particular the Global Compact for Migration.** The Secretary General's Action Agenda on Internal Displacement can transform the way displacement crises are resolved, prevented and addressed, and how humanitarian support for those most in need is delivered. The Global Compact for Migration offers a 360-degree vision, ten guiding principles and 23 objectives, commitments and actions. This provides a robust and internationally agreed framework of good migration governance; as a comprehensive blueprint for action, it is central to leverage migration for response and recovery efforts and accelerate migration-related SDG implementation.<sup>cxlviii</sup> Following the Global Compact's guiding principles in the development and implementation of migration laws, policies and practices will help achieve and solidify progress.

For example, it is critical to take a whole-of-government and whole-of-society approach, and ensure policies and programmes are rights-based, evidence-based, people-centred and gender-responsive, to boost policy coherence and improve migration governance at all levels.

- › **Weave human mobility into the new Rescue Plan for People and Planet.** To fast-track SDG implementation, countries will come together around a Rescue Plan with three fronts of action: equipping governance and institutions for sustainable and inclusive transformation, prioritizing policies and investments that have multiplier effects across the goals, and securing a surge in SDG financing and an enabling global environment for developing countries. Human mobility must be part of action under each of these pillars. In particular, it can play a key role in innovative development financing moving forward. To address the SDG funding gap, all possible levers need to be used – from trade to new financial products and philanthropy – and populations on the move already play a large and growing role in many of these. In this way, mobility-driven financing mechanisms can complement the United Nations SDG Stimulus Plan.
- › **End misinformation and political manipulation of human mobility.** Different types of migration have been simplified, stigmatized and politicized around the world. We regularly hear that migrants lead to lower wages, fewer jobs, heavy burdens on public services, lower social cohesion, and increased crime. In reality, these perceptions are often overblown or factually incorrect. This situation must change, not only to spare migrants unjust scapegoating, but to clear the road ahead for transformative change. Categorically, the action this document proposes cannot be effective without a fundamental shift in migration-related narratives. It is critical for actors within and across countries to work together to communicate facts, share people-centred stories, meaningfully engage with the roots of individuals' fears, and create bridges across communities. Participatory communication campaigns and media awareness training can help;

the frameworks above can also guide actors at different levels in doing this.

Effectively leveraging human mobility for progress has key implications for how development is done; business as usual is simply not good enough. A holistic approach is needed. Within countries, migration policymaking is often undertaken by different ministries and agencies in siloes, with mixed results. However, human mobility has links across humanitarian, development, peace and many other dimensions. This means that it requires the insights of human rights experts, diaspora members, labour economists, lawyers, business owners, climate scientists, gender specialists, sociologists, behavioural scientists and many, many others. We have the power to build off of what we now know to create a better environment for mobility to boost development, but this requires collaboration from actors across sectors and areas of expertise. Further, meeting people's immediate humanitarian needs while both reducing risk and vulnerability and building development solutions requires effective collaboration across the humanitarian–development–peace nexus (HDPN). New conversations are needed to combine different skill sets and bodies of experience to create solutions. This is exciting rather than onerous: precisely because human mobility cuts across so many areas, the opportunities to leverage its positives are rich and hold high potential for innovation.

Aside from cross-sectoral teamwork, strong international cooperation is needed. The political economy of migration governance is complex and, still too often, zero sum. Policies, usually set unilaterally, tend to have the interests of one country in mind. For example, while destination countries often aim to solve specific skills shortages, origin countries may be worried about the rights of their labour emigrants. By definition, human mobility links different geographies; we often forget that its policy responses do so as well. No country can address the challenges and opportunities of human mobility alone. As we already know is the case for sustainable development, the needs of countries are more likely to be met if they are considered together – collective gains reward collaboration on migration governance.



Not only does the 2030 Agenda remain possible and essential, but we must think ahead to do more. The SDG Summit Declaration can reignite global SDG commitment and advance the role of human mobility as part of an urgent strategy to reduce inequality, respond to the climate crisis, and much more. But beyond this, how can mobility support Our Common Agenda and the 2024 Summit of the Future?

The Acceleration Actions identified above in this report are aligned to the six transitions identified by the UNSDG – climate, biodiversity and pollution, energy, food systems, education, jobs and social protection, and digital connectivity – so efforts to meet the Actions also support transition action. Today there is a chance to make international commitments that act

as real catalysts for change rather than ring hollow. Collectively, humanity can overcome huge issues and achieve incredible progress; it remains completely within our capacity to govern human mobility in a way that benefits people and planet. Everyone has a role to play in thinking boldly and creatively about the future we want, and how to link sustainable development, peace, security, climate change and human mobility.

Put very simply, the world we want will not be achieved without considering safe, orderly and regular human mobility. There is now an unprecedented chance to acknowledge this and channel mobility to help achieve shared objectives. It is too late to waste this opportunity – and transformative change is within reach.



After floods, caused by torrential rains and the bursting of the banks of the Limpopo River in Mozambique, that led to significant displacement, IOM distributed shelter toolkits, as well as solar kits with cell phone chargers and lights to reduce security risks in the new relocation sites.  
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# ANNEX 1: IOM'S RECENT ACHIEVEMENTS UNDER THE ACCELERATION ACTIONS

## Acceleration Action 1: Recent achievements

IOM works for comprehensive and sustainable solutions that link humanitarian cash assistance with social protection systems, livelihood support and other development programmes: in 2022, **2.67 million beneficiaries were reached through Cash Based Initiatives (CBI)**.

Since 2020, IOM provided **13,491,987 primary health-care consultations** to migrants in countries in emergency and transition contexts. In the year 2022 only, IOM **responded to 112 disease outbreaks** such as polio, measles and Ebola and supported vaccination activities for **3 million hard-to-reach mobile populations, IDPs, refugees and host communities**.

In 2022, IOM engaged in **81 countries to address inequalities and discriminatory access to services or disadvantages that drive displacement and unsafe migration; and led initiatives in 92 countries that included youth as primary stakeholders or beneficiaries** and covering all the priority areas of the United Nations Youth Strategy.

## Acceleration Action 2: Recent achievements

IOM works to enhance the flexibility and accessibility of regular migration pathways. This includes a strong focus on information-sharing on existing migration pathway: **over 6.3 million migrants were reached with information on how to access regular migration pathways** in 2022.

In 2022, IOM co-hosted the first Global Diaspora Summit which was attended by over **700 participants from governments, diaspora organizations and other partners**. The Summit resulted in the Dublin Declaration and a plan of action to support strategic

engagement with diaspora organizations. And in the last year only, IOM engaged in initiatives with **diaspora groups and diaspora investment organizations in over 60 countries**.

## Acceleration Action 3: Recent achievements

In 2022 only, IOM's migration policy experience and expertise informed the development or revision of **86 migration policies and/or laws**. Further, IOM directly engaged in 51 countries, supporting national governments' efforts **to refine or mainstream migration into development or sectoral policy** across an increasingly broad array of thematic areas, such as social protection, health, employment and the environment.

In 2022, **7,751 government institutions and 564 local actors** were supported in ensuring the inclusion of migrants and/or displacement affected populations in policy processes that support cohesive communities and sustainable rural and urban development.

Globally, IOM partners with a range of civil society entities. During 2022, **135 IOM country offices partnered with national NGOs, 94 with academia and research institutes, and 79 with migrant associations or diaspora groups**, including on awareness-raising campaigns to counter xenophobia and discrimination, reaching 3,802,436 individuals.

## Acceleration Action 4: Recent achievements

IOM's partnership with the Department of Skill Development of the Ministry of Labour of Thailand, which works to integrate migrants into national skills training initiative, **led 163,620 migrant workers benefiting from skills training** in 2022 in that country only.

In 2022, **over 900 government authorities in 34 countries participated in training to support them** to better design and implement strategies to protect migrant workers during recruitment and across the migration continuum. In partnership with the Sustainable Hospitality Alliance, IOM launched a new global initiative to promote ethical recruitment in the hospitality and tourism industry called IRIS: Ethical Tourism. The initiative has had an impact on the policies of six major global brands, trained over **230 industry leaders from eight brands, and has led to the implementation of relevant policies in over 15,000 properties globally.**

#### Acceleration Action 5: Recent achievements

In 2022, **IOM established 154 initiatives in 61 countries to enhance migrants' access to legal identity and close the legal identity gap.**

Overall use of and engagement with the Migration Network Hub – a virtual meeting space where governments, stakeholders and experts can access and share migration-related information and services

– grew during the year. During Migration Week 2022, the Hub received more than **30,000 web page views.**

#### Acceleration Action 6: Recent achievements

In 2022, **51 IOM country offices produced research in diverse contexts to support integrating human mobility into National Adaptation Plans;** 43 engaged in policy support; 23 in climate change adaptation activities; and 21 in mitigation activities.

In 2022, **IOM reached 1,522,660 people in 80 countries with activities** in the following thematic areas: community stabilization; durable solutions; peacebuilding and peace preservation; disaster risk reduction; disarmament, demobilization and reintegration; preventing violent extremism; restoring housing, land and property rights; reparations and humanitarian support to victims of human rights violations.


In 2022, **5,728 government officials were supported** by IOM in the development of tools, systems and strategies to identify and/or address drivers of conflict.



An IOM mental health and psychosocial support counsellor leads a session with a woman.

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Emergency preparedness training including CCCM, emergency shelter management, fire safety. Humanitarian principles applied to emergency response. © IOM 2019 / Akil Blanchard



The restoration of appropriate conditions of living communities, including efforts to reduce disaster risk factors.

The provision of emergency services and public assistance during or immediately after a disaster in order to save lives, reduce health impacts, ensure public safety and meet the basic subsistence needs of the people affected.

IOM  
UN MIGRANTS

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